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Foreword by May Darwich
foreword
The hopes following the 2011 Arab uprisings in the Middle East were quickly 
overshadowed by disillusionment and despair with the outbreak of civil wars 
in Syria and Libya as well as military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen. 
These events not only challenged the Arab state at domestic levels; they 
altered regional dynamics and changed the place of the Middle East in the 
international system. These changes impelled scholars of political science in 
general to rethink their theoretical tools and concepts in different ways in the 
study of the region. Yet, scholars of the international relations of the Middle 
East found themselves torn between 
two groups: International Relations 
(IR) scholars with little interest in the 
region and regional specialists with 
little interest in theories.
Middle East scholars have consistently 
warned against what they perceived 
as a significant intellectual gulf that 
divided IR Theory and the study of 
international relations of the Middle 
East. Revealing a lack of cross-
fertilization between IR theories and 
region-focused analyses for decades, 
some scholars, such as Mark Tessler, 
Fawaz Gerges, Gregory Gause, and Morten Valbjørn, have highlighted the 
necessity to move beyond the “Area Studies Controversy” in favour of a 
dialogue between IR Theory and Middle Eastern Studies. A current review of 
recent scholarship on the international relations of the Middle East suggests 
that a different direction is being taken recently, as IR and the Middle East are 
increasingly engaged in serious interchanges. Middle East scholars have often 
applied IR theoretical approaches while seeking a middle ground between 
the general abstractions of IR theory and regional particularities. The last 
three decades provided numerous examples of excellent and sophisticated 
“The hopes following 
the 2011 Arab uprisings 
in the Middle 
East were quickly 
overshadowed by 
disillusionment and 
despair...”
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studies that combined 
IR theories, even though 
selectively, and an in-depth 
knowledge of regional affairs 
in fertile ways. Whereas some 
of the theoretically-informed 
research on the international 
relations of the Middle East 
was primarily preoccupied with how available theoretical frameworks are 
applicable to Middle East cases, other scholars have criticized these attempts 
for de-emphasizing regional particularities and complexities. They have opted 
instead for a modified IR Theory applied to the Middle East. This adaptation has 
followed several strategies. Some scholars have contextualized mainstream IR 
approaches to fit the alleged exceptional characteristics of the Middle East, 
especially those focusing on Historical Sociology and the English School in 
IR. Other scholars have however adopted a disciplinary eclecticism combining 
insights from several conceptual approaches to capture the complexity of 
regional politics as a corrective strategy to IR theories, such as Raymond 
Hinnebusch, Anoush Ehteshami, and Gregory Gause.
The recent scholarship on the international relations of the Middle East 
reveals that research in the area is characterised by serious, yet unsystematic 
attempts to combine in-depth knowledge of the region, on the one hand, 
coupled with universal theoretical approaches from IR Theory, on the other 
hand. It also highlights the unidimensional dialogue between IR and the 
regional expertise, where the interchange was limited to theory testing, 
application, and adaptation to produce sophisticated and complex analyses of 
various regional phenomena. Yet, the Middle East remains largely invisible in 
IR theory development.
Drawing on her previous work in the field of international relations of the Middle 
East, Louise Fawcett engages in a self-reflection about the current dialogue 
between general IR debates and the debates among regional specialists. 
Louise argues that despite the recent efforts to bridge both fields, the current 
interaction between IR theories and regional specialists remains very limited, 
and both should be seen as complementing rather than undermining each 
other. She illustrates this argument through three themes: regionalism in the 
Middle East, the international relations of Iran, and state durability beyond 
the Arab Spring. Through these themes, she provides intriguing analyses of 
how IR theories can enrich our understanding of the Middle East, but also 
how IR Theory can benefit from the richness and complexity of cases in the 
Middle East to develop ‘truly’ universal theoretical approaches inclusive of the 
Global South.
“The last three decades 
provided numerous 
examples of excellent and 
sophisticated studies...”
by May Darwich
The Middle easT in The inTernaTional sysTeM 
inTrodUcTion1
The year 2016 is a particularly timely 
one for a re-launch of the Institute 
for Middle East and Islamic Studies 
at Durham University. Events in 
the Middle East and North Africa 
continue to present huge challenges 
for regional and international order 
and yet remain poorly understood 
by scholars and policy makers alike. 
This underlines the importance of 
area studies centres like this one to 
promoting a better understanding 
of the contemporary international 
system and represents a welcome 
reversal, or at least slowing down, 
of a trend towards the closure of 
different area studies institutes and 
the resulting loss of these centres of 
expertise. Once gone they are hard to 
replace. In this short paper, the aim 
is to promote thinking and further 
discussion about the relationship 
between Middle East Studies and 
International Relations (IR) and the 
ways in which the two may be more 
fruitfully engaged in order to better 
understand the politics of change in 
the Middle East. 
IR and Area Studies: the Problem
There has long been an uneasy 
relationship between International 
Relations and Area Studies. 
International Relations scholars 
delight in theorising and modelling 
state behaviour; Area Studies 
scholars delight in detail and 
reject political science formulas as 
restrictive and artificial. Both adopt 
rather stand-offish positions to each 
other. I seek to argue that this divide 
is both unhealthy and unnecessary: 
there are many fertile fields to 
explore in the intersections of the 
two disciplines as recent scholarship 
has shown. Continuing what has 
been called a ‘modest renaissance’2 in 
efforts to integrate and bridge divides 
between International Relations 
and Area Studies, I draw on my own 
work on the International Relations 
of the Middle East in particular and 
the developing world more generally 
to demonstrate that not only is the 
relationship a highly productive one, 
but a potential source of high quality 
collaboration. 
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Both International Relations and Area Studies have strong roots in the UK: 
International Relations as an early 20th century phenomenon and Area Studies 
as a product of the post-World War II era. Yet while International Relations 
has gone from strength to strength, taken up by more and more university 
departments around the world and establishing itself in the Political Science 
mainstream, Area Studies, having established a comfortable niche for itself 
over twenty or thirty years, has come increasingly under siege. While it is not 
true in all countries, some Area Studies departments in the UK have closed 
down giving way to ever-expanding and better-funded Political Science 
departments. Why has this happened? Some have critiqued the discipline’s 
parochialism, the robustness of its methods, in particular for failing to adopt 
new globalizing trends in the social sciences; others have critiqued its failure to 
be policy relevant. In the case of the Middle East, scholars have been repeatedly 
blamed for failing to predict key events, which, in turn, became major episodes 
or turning points in International Relations, like the Iranian Revolution of 
1979, the events surrounding 9/11, and finally the Arab Spring. The 9/11 case 
led to the infamous Martin Kramer argument about the irrelevance and even 
failure of Area Studies3.  The Arab Spring, similarly, caused Gregory Gause to 
ask why the Middle East Studies had missed the mark4.  
Do such observations indeed mean that the Middle East Studies have failed? 
Hardly. If we use policy prediction as a measure of success, International 
Relations theory has also signally failed to predict equally momentous events 
like the end of the Cold War5, the persistence of US unipolarity or the survival 
of NATO. For that matter it has also failed as regards the Middle East, as I 
will show in a moment, by focusing mainly on considerations of power and 
interest and neglecting, at least until recently, the role that ideas, identities 
and small states and non-state actors can play in shaping inter-regional 
relations. So just as Middle East scholars may be critiqued for getting things 
wrong, so may International Relations specialists. Political Science theories 
in general, for that matter, have also failed on explaining the Arab Spring. 
Many authors had sought to explain, a few years before the uprisings started, 
the stubbornness of authoritarianism and predicted its durability. A much-
respected colleague and former tutor Roger Owen, in his Rise and Fall of Arab 
Presidents for Life confessed how he had to revise the introduction of his book 
explaining the tenacity of authoritarian regimes as the Arab Spring events 
unfolded6. Needless to say, much of what he wrote remains highly relevant in 
the light of subsequent events. 
The point here is not to show whether or how either of the two disciplines of 
IR and Area Studies have succeeded or failed in their different tasks, rather 
to suggest that both would succeed better if they paid more attention to 
each other rather than building walls and engaging in futile interdisciplinary 
debates. This has led to the ‘two hats’ phenomenon colourfully referred to by 
an Oxford colleague Avi Shlaim, who described how we wear one hat when 
talking to Middle East Studies audiences and another when talking to IR 
specialists! Wouldn’t it be better to wear one hat and simply to acknowledge 
the high degree of interdependence between the two? To state this seems to 
be stating the obvious, yet it runs counter to current orthodoxy. How could, 
for example, a book on contemporary Middle East Politics (or for that matter 
Latin American, African or Asian politics) ignore the external dimension 
which informs it? You might wish to focus on the development and working 
of political institutions in the region but would have to refer to the way in 
which those institutions were shaped and informed by outside forces and 
influences. If the former colonial powers were involved in the very creation of 
states and institutions, a legacy that stubbornly remains, their successors, the 
superpowers of the Cold War and today’s great powers since have maintained 
extraordinarily high levels of interest in and often direct involvement in 
the politics, economics, and security of the region. Consider the cases of 
contemporary Iraq or Syria. It makes no sense to think about institution 
breakdown or institution building without the ever-present external element. 
This notion of great power ‘penetration’ of the region, a term coined by L. 
Carl Brown7, does not mean that their influence is all determining. It is not, as 
events of the Arab Spring clearly revealed. But it does imply that any student 
of Middle East Politics must consider this domain and take it very seriously.
By the same token, International Relations scholars also need to take more 
seriously the study of different areas. Area Studies with all its variety and 
historical and empirical richness, represents an opportunity to open up and 
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break down dominant Western or 
European theorising and modes of 
thinking. In recent language, it offers 
the opportunities to “provincialize” 
European International Relations 
and its simplifying notions of the 
Westphalian state and international 
order. This was the theme of a 
recent (2015) International Studies 
Association conference aptly named 
‘Global IR: Regional Worlds’. No IR 
text can or should ignore the rich 
cases that the Middle East and other 
areas supply and how they inform and 
illuminate aspects of the discipline. 
How can we theorise about the world 
without closely observing regional 
peculiarity and practice? These 
practices may help to confirm or deny 
the principles on which such theories 
are based or help to build new ones, 
but we cannot block out regional 
context. The trouble with much IR 
theory, at least until quite recently, 
is that it was highly West-centric: 
mostly designed for the Western 
world by Western scholars. It not 
only used Western based theories, 
but expected different world regions 
to adjust to its explanatory and 
predictive capabilities8.  
This particularly struck me when 
I first started to study IR as a 
postgraduate student with a special 
interest in developing countries: 
the Middle East in particular. I had 
written a thesis about Iran during 
the Cold War, which contested the 
assumption that the balance of 
power after WW2 was the only key to 
understanding events and sought to 
uncover the agency of a smaller state 
– Iran in this case. Indeed, having 
just read Milan Kundera’s novel 
The Unbearable Lightness of Being, it 
occurred to me at that time that IR 
theory, was also ‘unbearably light’, 
though perhaps not in the sense 
intended by Kundera! In arriving at 
this conclusion, I acknowledge that 
perhaps I was too influenced by my 
own historical background and eye for 
detail, or by my reading early sceptics 
of the so-called English school like 
Hedley Bull, who repeatedly warned 
of the dangers of excessive theorising 
in his call for a classical approach; 
(in fact he declared that rather than 
a theory his IR should be seen as 
an approach), or his mentor Martin 
Wight, who famously asked the 
question ‘Why is there no IR theory?’9 
Conversely, I was reacting against 
the claim made by Stanley Hoffman 
that International Relations was an 
‘American Social Science’10.  
 
Of course, one could argue that IR 
has come a long way since Hedley 
Bull and Martin Wight, and not only 
the English School, but also other 
European IR schools would certainly 
argue against the Hoffman claim 
that IR is still an ‘American’ social 
science. But one is no less reminded 
of the lightness of IR theory as we 
consider how mainstream methods 
have developed and now, in an age 
of quantification and measurement 
how much simplification (we like 
to call it parsimony) and ignorance 
of empiricism prevails. This is 
particularly true for the case of 
Above: Professor Fawcett speaking at the relaunch of IMEIS, Durham
The first case is the phenomenon of regionalism or regional cooperation in 
the Middle East, which draws on work I have done in comparative regionalism; 
the second is the International Relations of Iran; third and finally I comment 
on the debate about state durability beyond the Arab Spring. In all cases I 
offer some preliminary observations and suggest that current theory has often 
provided a poor fit with regional and local dynamics and is therefore as likely 
to confuse or obscure as to clarify. The onus is then on IR scholars to extend 
their reach to the highly-differentiated experience of developing countries 
and to Area Studies scholars to take on the challenge of a selective embrace 
and sifting of relevant theory. I should introduce a caveat here. I speak as if this 
was a rather barren field and scholars had not already risen to this challenge. 
They of course have: many colleagues (including in this Centre of course) have 
sought to re-evaluate the IR of the Middle East from a variety of perspectives 
– I have collaborated with a number of them in an edited volume11. As Morten 
Valbjorn points out, the idea of using the Middle East as a laboratory to test 
IR, if underdeveloped, is not new12. Over the last twenty years now there has 
been the modest renaissance, referred to in the introductory remarks, in 
integrating theory and area expertise. The work by Tessler et al in 1999 was 
one of the first attempts to understand Middle East Politics from a ‘Social 
Science’ perspective13. Others have followed suit including Fred Halliday, Ray 
Hinnebusch, Bahgat Korany, Fred Lawson, Gregory Gause, Marc Lynch, Anoush 
Ehteshami and many more. All these works have used selectively IR theory 
and applied it to regional studies. The merits and qualities of such exercises 
are not in question, though they may not have received the attention they 
deserve. IR scholars, for their part, have not neglected the Middle East, as I will 
discuss further in a moment: one of the most cited examples of the so-called 
balance of threat theory, a revisionist branch of neo-realism, is Stephen Walt’s 
book on alliances which precisely draws on the Middle East for its cases14. 
What we learn from such works is not that IR and Area Studies have been 
completely distant from each other, but that much of the work done remains 
somewhat tentative and inconclusive – outside the mainstream. Laboratory 
experiments do not always work which leaves one wondering if the available 
tools are adequate for the task. To make IR and Middle East Studies work 
together requires selectivity, sophistication, and much relevant expertise. 
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“the idea of using the Middle East 
as a laboratory to test IR, if 
underdeveloped, is not new...”
developing countries, despite the 
advent of more critical theory and 
a wave of post-colonial studies. In 
what follows I pursue this theme 
and critique, while also suggesting 
that the way forward is to continue 
the task of integration, to practice 
inter-disciplinarity and to insist – 
and this should not be difficult in 
a world of rising powers where the 
locale even ideas about power have 
shifted – to bring in the local, the 
regional as well as the international 
level of analysis. Indeed, the rising 
power phenomenon is in many 
ways a vindication of the area 
studies approach. How can we 
understand China’s rise without 
understanding China? I continue 
with some further elaboration 
of the IR theory problem as I see 
it, mainly from a Middle East 
perspective, but one that can be 
extended to other arenas of area 
studies. Here I share the view of 
a number of area specialists that 
the Middle East case should not 
be regarded as exceptional, but 
should be looked at comparatively 
alongside a range of developing, 
or Third World countries, or what 
today we call the Global South. 
After considering how different 
scholars have approached the 
question of Middle East IR, I move 
to look at some illustrative cases 
that lie within my own research 
area and reflect on how these throw 
light upon the problem, cautioning 
against reliance on existing theory 
without appropriate safeguards.  
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“Of course, one could 
argue that IR has 
come a long way 
since Hedley Bull and 
Martin Wight, and 
not only the English 
School...”
quite proper to acknowledge that such theory had its origins in Europe, but 
its transference to the non-European world has been deeply problematic and 
often unrewarding. In this sense, Said is right to stress the importance of local 
context and understanding since universalism may erase distinction between 
people and place and therefore limit understanding.
This idea of travelling theory and the need to re-construct and adapt theory 
to local reality is the cornerstone for good IR, for understanding the IR of the 
Middle East and for building disciplinary bridges. One doesn’t need to go all 
the way with Said’s analysis to agree that this is a sensible way to proceed 
in thinking about the relevance of IR theory to the developing world. It 
certainly doesn’t mean that the effort to apply existing theory, or that the very 
categories of analysis we use should be abandoned – the radical post-colonial 
critique is a useful corrective to mainstream theorising – but cannot replace it 
(and the Arab Spring case bears this out). It does mean that we should exercise 
caution in arguing that our study of the Middle East will be enriched by simple 
theory transference. The call to area studies and IR scholars to engage is a call 
to counter generalization and simplification and consider regional specificity 
and the history and development of Middle Eastern societies and cultures. 
As Clifford Geertz has aptly written: ‘One of the things everybody knows 
but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics 
reflect the design of its culture’18. The same indeed can be said of a country’s 
international relations. In this regard, of course, constructivism is helpful in 
highlighting how states and other actors’ choices are informed and shaped by 
local and external influences and impressions. Still, constructivism can only 
take us so far, as I will show for the Iranian case in a moment.
Not all would agree with this argument and still claim that existing IR theory 
can do the required work. Some of the best-known scholars in IR (mostly from 
the US) have found in realism and its variants what they regard as adequate 
explanation for state behaviour in the Middle East. In his study of international 
conflicts, Joseph Nye finds that the Middle East is consonant with the ‘realist 
model’19, while Stephen Walt, already mentioned, in his analysis of alliance 
formation argues for a modified balance of power approach based on threat 
assessment. Hansen’s study of the Middle East under uni-polarity also uses a 
neo-realist framework20. There is no similarly robust account of Middle East IR 
based on a neo-liberal or liberal institutionalist model, revealing the particular 
difficulty of this line of scholarship outside its North Atlantic or European 
home. Latter day constructivists, like Michael Barnett, Shibley Telhami, and 
others, however, have had a field day in exposing how, when it comes to the 
Middle East, culture or identity may come first. While all the above refer to local 
context there is nevertheless an attempt to make the evidence fit the theory. 
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Questions about conflict and 
cooperation, the roles of states versus 
other actors lie at the centre of the 
IR endeavour, yet many of the great 
debates in IR, and the neo-realist/
neo-liberal debate is a good example, 
have tended to proceed without much 
explicit reference to the experience of 
the Third World. Consider the end of 
the Cold War for example. The role of 
the Third World in the Cold War itself 
has received more attention thanks 
to the global histories of the Cold War 
by authors like Arne Westad15, but 
the ending of the Cold War, like its 
beginning, is still treated as mostly 
a superpower event. IR theory has 
still not sufficiently travelled to the 
periphery. 
In saying this, one must again 
acknowledge that some successful 
transference has taken place, 
especially in those areas where 
conditions are more favourable: we 
see how theories of globalization and 
interdependence travelled better to 
parts of Asia; how the idea of a security 
community may fit in the Americas, 
though in both cases we should not 
ignore the particular antecedents and 
distinctive conditions that prevail in 
these areas. But when we come to the 
Middle East or Africa it is certainly 
true that theory constructed on the 
basis of Western experience travels 
poorly. The case of the African state 
in IR remains a deeply problematic 
one as highlighted by the work of 
Robert Jackson on ‘quasi states’; can 
we say the same about the Middle 
East today where traditional notions 
of statehood and sovereignty have 
been under challenge from sub-state 
and transnational forces who propose 
alternative orders? Should we indeed 
still reify the state as the starting 
point of analysis? Though the views 
of the British historian Toynbee 
have rather gone out of fashion, 
one cannot but sympathise with 
his critique of Western historians 
which we could well apply to today’s 
political scientists: He berates 
them for their egocentricity... ‘They 
consider other histories only in so 
far as they are relevant to Western 
history, or they think of themselves as 
somehow standing outside history.’ 
This view was cited subsequently 
by Albert Hourani who, in his Vision 
of History16, sought further to make 
sense of the emerging twentieth 
century Middle East and the evident 
tensions between old and new ideas. 
The above remarks recall Edward 
Said’s observations about travelling 
theory17.  In a brilliant piece, now 
less cited, he writes how theories 
developed in a particular context 
evolve and change as they move 
through time and space, losing 
their original meaning and purpose. 
‘A theory arrives as the result of 
specific historical circumstances’, he 
writes, ‘what happens to it when for 
different reasons, and under different 
circumstances, it is used again and 
again? What does this tell us about 
the theory and its limitations?’ This 
observation is relevant to one body 
of theory I will turn to in a moment, 
that of regional integration. It is 
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theories of integration do fit however 
into bigger bodies of IR theory in a 
number of ways and we can therefore 
talk meaningfully about MENA 
regionalism as a case to test theory 
relevance.
One doesn’t need to know much 
about the European or Middle Eastern 
cases to see that it is fanciful to think 
that interstate cooperation in MENA 
could be understood in terms of North 
American or European paradigms of 
regionalism. Where are the NATOs, 
the EUs or NAFTAs? According to 
such paradigms integration is said 
to have ‘failed’ if it does not conform 
to a Vinerian customs union or a 
Deutschian security community. 
Measured against such criteria the 
Middle East undoubtedly gets off to 
a bad start. As a preface one might 
point out, as scholars have done, that 
levels of regionalization are low, and 
some question whether or not the 
region is a region properly so called, 
but leaving this definitional problem 
aside, it is evident that in terms of 
economic integration the region has 
fared poorly despite the constant 
Greater Arab Free Trade Area refrain. 
(We should note the fact that the 
GCC as a smaller grouping of more 
likeminded states has moved further 
in the direction of Customs Union as 
Matteo Legrenzi26 has shown). This 
fact has been repeatedly pointed 
out by numerous scholars, from 
the careful analysis of Roger Owen, 
Michael Hudson, Fred Lawson and 
others. This is partly because of the 
nature of the regional economy itself, 
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“it is important 
not to throw 
out the state 
baby with the 
post-colonial 
bathwater...”
The response of Middle East scholars to this IR invasion has been to take a 
nuanced approach. Middle East scholars make more modest, and region 
specific claims. Some reject crude bipolarity: observing the agency of small 
powers Leonard Binder noted how during the Cold War the system was neither 
‘global nor total’21; another Cold War scholar Malcolm Kerr viewed regional 
politics from an ideological rather than power political perspective22. The late 
Fred Halliday, a scholar whose work I have much admired, offered a salutary 
comment on constructivism in his book The Middle East in International 
Relations23. Critiquing what he called the post-realist fetish for culture, he 
reminds us that when it comes to the Middle East, the cultural perspective 
‘was always there’, strengthening his claim for a sound historical sociology as 
the starting point for understanding any world region.
In the above we see again, the case for nuance and selectivity, the rejection of 
absolutes. In this regard, it would be just as wrong to see the Middle East as 
better understood through a radical or post-modern paradigm as it is wrong to 
see it solely through a realist or constructivist paradigm. A new fetish for such 
a paradigm has developed around the ‘end of Sykes-Picot’ narrative, regarding 
the Arab Spring, which describes states in the Middle East as inherently 
artificial and alien constructions, despite a hundred years of (relative) stability. 
Notwithstanding the current turmoil and its far-reaching consequences, 
I would still venture that much of the older historically informed and far 
less dogmatic IR scholarship on state durability remains relevant. Also, as 
Lesley Carl Brown wrote, ‘our story is told in terms of states... it is the study 
of states that will bring out the underlying trends and patterns of the IR of 
the Middle East’24. Viewing the current regional fragmentation and rise of 
multiple non-state groups, one might question such an assumption. But it is 
important not to throw out the state baby with the post-colonial bathwater. 
For all its difficulties, and amid multiple predictions of ‘failed states’ the state 
nonetheless remains the most important point of reference. It is state agency, 
whether regional or global that is at least in part responsible for inspiring and 
challenging the current regional disorder. This is borne out, I believe, in my 
cases below. 
Regionalism in the Middle East
This is an area I have considered in some detail, both in respect of the region and 
also comparatively, and it throws light on the points I already made25. It may at 
first sight be a curious place to test IR theory because regional integration has 
a set of rather unique theories applied to it such that it does not necessarily fit 
neatly into the mainstream paradigms described. Many theories of integration 
have derived from the European experience and still fit that experience best – 
even though that experience is changing and evolving as we speak. However, 
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of the oil embargo and subsequent raising of oil prices. These cooperative 
moments may not have lasted and they may not amount to integration of 
the form that Western scholars identify, but they were important moments 
nonetheless. Finally, what are we to make of the latest, very tentative, turn in 
Arab and ME regionalism where Arab states appeared to embrace new norms 
in respect of the Arab Spring uprisings? The passage of UN resolutions on 
Libya critically depended on the support of regional states and institutions, 
whether the League of Arab States, Gulf Cooperation Council or the wider 
Islamic Conference Organization. Subsequent policies on Syria and Yemen 
also demonstrated initial policy coherence on how to best limit the damaging 
effects of the fallout from the uprisings. Whether or not we were witnessing 
evidence of new regionalism in MENA (and the subsequent evidence has 
been disappointing) and whether or not this conforms more broadly to 
other regionalisms around the world is not the point here. What I want to 
demonstrate is that measured by standard criteria Middle East regionalism 
has ‘failed’; yet a more nuanced appreciation of regional trends suggests an 
alternative starting point and interpretation. And younger scholars like Marco 
Pinfari and Farah Dakhlallah have precisely identified these kinds of trends. 
Indeed Pinfari27 has recalibrated an older account of comparative regionalism 
by Joseph Nye28 and offers a differentiated, altogether more positive picture of 
the story of Middle East regionalism showing that what you count, and how you 
count it matters. These more sophisticated and empirically informed accounts 
draw upon, but also add to existing bodies of theory by introducing regional 
nuance. They are examples of how theory and practice can be successfully 
knitted together.
Iran and International Relations
And what of Iran, a country at the forefront of the international scene at 
least since the Iranian Revolution, if not before? How does our toolkit fare 
in explaining the behaviour of a state, once the darling of the West, which 
has been called a pariah, placed on an ‘axis of evil’, the subject of multiple 
UN sanctions regimes, then party to a nuclear deal endorsed by the US, and 
now attempting to maintain a favourable regional balance of power through 
its actions in Iraq and Syria? Iran is a good example of both how Middle 
East Studies and IR failed to spot or predict impending transformation, also 
confirming Robert Satloff’s claim that in policy-making terms Washington has 
a poor record of ‘even recognising, let alone managing change.’
As is often the case, the simple realist approach comes in handy while 
discussing aspects of Iran’s behaviour and attempted alliance building and 
this has been true of both the period of the Pahlavi monarchy and of the 
post-revolutionary period. In this respect, and this is surprising to some, we 
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which has failed to provide incentives 
or the necessary supply-demand 
conditions for cooperation, but also 
regional politics and rivalries, which 
have blocked efforts at coordination. 
Without the necessary economic and 
political incentives in place, it is easy 
to see how any neo-functional logic 
on the European model will be hard 
to observe. The same, of course, can 
be said of many developing country 
regions. 
This also applies to security 
cooperation. Although there should 
be a high demand for regional 
security, it is evident that the major 
regional organization with security 
provision, the Arab League has 
failed to supply it, at least in any 
comprehensive way. The reasons 
for this relative failure of security 
cooperation, a particular concern of 
mine, are regional divisions, regime 
type and high degrees of external 
interference, which together conspire 
against successful cooperation. There 
is no pan-regional organization 
or security framework, which 
incorporates non-Arab states like 
Iran, Israel or Turkey and nothing 
akin to a CSCE process, which might 
act as a trigger to wider cooperation. 
The tendency has been for outside 
powers like the US but also the EU to 
attempt to supply regional security 
in various schemes (The Greater 
Middle East, Mediterranean Union 
etc), but these have suffered from 
the problems of lack of legitimacy 
and fit, showing how plans devised 
by Western policy makers fail to 
accommodate regional realities. Here 
we may make a contrast between say, 
efforts by the African Union and other 
African institutions to create a more 
comprehensive security architecture 
to deal with regional problems. A 
key difference in Africa however, is 
the relative absence of superpower 
overlay, as Barry Buzan describes 
it: the international community is 
less interested in ‘solving’ Africa’s 
problems. Middle Eastern states 
have not hitherto been free to pursue 
their own security solutions without 
external intervention.
However, the picture of failure is 
perhaps too absolute and here we 
need to re-examine our measurement 
criteria. If we seek FTAs or security 
communities, we find failure; if we 
look to wider efforts to build upon 
common identities and practices, to 
establish some kind of modus vivendi 
for Arab states in a complex regional 
order, the evidence is somewhat 
different. Right from the start of the 
LAS history there have been efforts 
by different Arab states to lead a 
consensus on certain issues: Arabism 
in a loose sense, expressed in common 
positions on Israel for example. 
Under Nasser, the Arab world sought 
to demonstrate leadership in the 
form of anti-colonialism and non-
alignment. Not wholly unsuccessfully 
if you consider the Suez crisis and its 
aftermath. We shouldn’t forget also 
that during the 1970s a grouping of 
Arab oil producing states (OAPEC) 
also spearheaded a movement to 
resist Western dominance in the form 
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of a pro-Western kind. On the outside, Iran was a ‘good’ international actor. 
It joined pro-Western alliances like the Baghdad Pact in 1955, embraced 
modernizing policies, taking the ‘right’ (that is the pro-Western side) in the 
Cold War and recognising, unlike its Arab neighbours, Israel. 
While all this may have been comforting to its Western allies, there was of 
course another side, underpinned by the destabilising Mossadeq period when 
nationalist forces demanded the Shah’s abdication; followed by a period where 
regime opponents were zealously pursued and human rights neglected. Yet 
despite murmurs from Presidents Kennedy and Carter, the Shah in the 1970s 
was starting to look like one of Owen’s presidents for life31. 
Indeed, it was precisely Iran’s rational foreign policy behaviour in a Cold 
War framework that led to one of the big pre-end of Cold War shocks to 
the international system, providing a foretaste of what was to come. Just as 
theorists and policy makers failed to predict the end of the Cold War they also 
failed utterly to predict and explain the nature of the Iranian revolution and 
its impact on International Relations. Iran since has continued to represent a 
puzzle and challenge to policy makers and IR theorists. Still capable of extreme 
pragmatism, as shown in a number of foreign policy episodes, as during the 
Gulf War and the Khatami presidency; or again after 9/11 when Iran showed 
respect for America’s dead; or more recently in response to events in the Arab 
world, Iran remains in other ways unpredictable and revisionist, whether 
in its policy as regards Israel or in its pretensions to nuclear status. This is 
not a vindication of Samuel Huntington’s thesis of civilizational divides, or 
the triumph of constructivism however. As described here, Iran’s behaviour 
crosses and bridges theoretical explanations of state behaviour, which makes 
perfectly explicable its desire, under the more centrist President Rouhani, its 
more balanced current stance, offering to pose as the honest broker amid the 
threatened fragmentation of Iraq, or driving a hard bargain in its nuclear deal.
The complexities of Iranian foreign policy, and the real or perceived challenges 
it poses to the international system today, have been differently interpreted by 
commentators. Whatever your view and mine inclines to the more pragmatic, 
the Iranian case shows, as in the case of regionalism, that there are no easy 
answers and no quick theoretical fixes. As a well-established scholar of the 
Middle East world, James Bill wisely observed after observing fifty years of 
practice: ‘Middle Eastern political processes defy observation, discourage 
generalization and resist explanation’32. We need to carefully study and 
observe regional practice before theory building can take place.
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can identify as much continuity 
as change in Iran’s foreign policy. 
Iran has long held aspirations to 
be a regional great power, and to 
sustain a regional balance of power, 
regardless of regime type. Iran’s 
security dilemma is an unusual 
one even by Middle Eastern 
standards – its geography, history 
and demography ensure that. But 
aside from realism we need to turn 
to the revisionist/revolutionist 
paradigms and to Iran’s longer term 
‘world views’ to explain positions 
which transcend simple geopolitics 
and material explanations. In this 
respect just as understanding China 
today, requires a complementary 
Chinese worldview of the kind 
identified by Rosemary Foot29; so 
does understanding Iran. Iran’s 
world view is thus one in which 
realist power-based considerations 
are filtered through history and 
informed by revolutionist and 
revisionist ideas born in part of its 
revolution in 1979, but also of its 
prior and continuing xenophobic, 
anti-imperial and Third Wordlist 
stances, latterly revealed for 
example in relationships with 
states like Venezuela30. 
Yet Iran, for much of its modern 
or twentieth century history has 
mostly behaved like a rational 
state actor, closely conforming 
to traditional realist paradigm. 
This was particularly so under the 
second Shah, Mohammed Reza, 
who cast the country in the light 
of an emerging regional power, but 
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“The passage of 
UN resolutions on 
Libya critically 
depended on 
the support of 
regional states 
and institutions...”
And the Arab Spring? 
The above point, finally, has been 
reinforced by events of the Arab 
Spring, which has shown how the 
Middle East has once again surprised 
and confounded scholars and policy 
makers alike. The Arab Spring – 
today a rather maligned term, with 
orientalist connotations, but one that 
captured the early promise of the 
social mobilisation and demands for 
change that swept the Arab world, 
has had a mixed and contradictory 
reception by the scholarly community. 
Early enthusiasm regarding a 
‘democratizing wave’ rapidly gave 
rise to pessimism about alternatively, 
authoritarian resilience, or the 
production of failed or failing states 
as the result of civil wars and social 
unrest that ensued. Yet the outcome 
of the Arab uprisings is unlikely, in 
the long term, to reverse popular 
demands for reform – liberalization 
is a protracted and messy process 
after all. Nor is it likely to produce 
many ‘failed states’ in the literal 
sense. Failed or failing states have 
a tendency to right themselves33, 
particularly when it is in the interests 
of other regional states and the 
international community that 
they should do so. Even the much 
spoken about ‘artificial borders’ that 
have characterised the region will 
likely endure. So the lessons that IR 
teaches about state durability in the 
international system are useful here 
as are those studies of liberalisation 
and popular mobilisation which look 
at the regional experience and do not 
merely seek to apply Western models 
of democratization without factoring 
in local conditions34. Once again, 
the interdisciplinary endeavour in 
respect of explaining change is likely 
to be the most productive one.
Conclusion
To conclude, the lament about the 
International Relations/Political 
Science and Area Studies divide is 
rather an old, and even tired one. 
It needs to be superseded by an 
acknowledgement of the bridge-
building that is currently on going 
and efforts to continue it by scholars 
around the world – this is an 
important part of what is today called 
‘Global IR’. New trends in the Social 
Sciences which ignore local realities 
in the search for generalizable trends, 
reveal precisely how very important 
Area Studies is to provide the kind 
of empirical knowledge and analysis 
that is absent in much modern 
research. Without it we surely cannot 
pretend to better understand the 
politics of change in the Middle East 
or in the wider world. 
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foreword
Few predicted the outbreak in 2010 of what some referred to as the Arab 
‘Spring’, others as the Arab uprisings. For all, however, the transformative 
potential of the uprisings that swept across much of the Middle East presaged 
a new beginning in a region where the entrenched nature of a largely 
autocratic state-based order has previously seemed impervious. Of course, 
the ‘change’ that the uprisings appeared to portend has for many proved to 
be but a chimera. Now, in bitter reference to the passing of the seasons, talk 
of an Arab ‘winter’ is not uncommon as, on the one hand, state failure and 
fragmentation in Yemen, Libya, Syria 
and Iraq has disfigured so much of the 
region while elsewhere, the ‘fierce’ 
nature of the autocratic state has 
appeared all the more durable. Even 
if one accepts that the Middle East is 
not exceptional - just different - for 
many the transformative potential 
- save for the fragile steps towards 
democracy in Tunisia - has not been 
realised. 
Business as usual? Well, as Bahgat 
Korany of the American University 
of Cairo opines in this thought 
provoking article, not quite. As he 
notes, scholarly engagement with the 
very idea of change, let alone state formation and transformation across the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been a largely neglected area of 
scholarly enquiry. Perhaps this is understandable in a region defined by war 
and violence; Realism alongside its various paradigmatic progenies have long 
held intellectual sway, at least among International Relations scholars. With 
its predisposition towards ‘business as usual’ and an emphasis upon classic 
fare such as ‘balance of power’ Realism offered a convincing account of politics 
“Few predicted 
the outbreak in 
2010 of what some 
referred to as 
the Arab ‘Spring’, 
others as the Arab 
uprisings...”
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and state behaviour across 
the region, its parsimonious 
explanations all the more 
convincing because of the very 
nature of autocratic regimes 
that denied agency to domestic 
forces. 
But by focusing upon the idea 
‘transformative change’ which 
he defines as change that 
leaves an impact, Professor 
Korany highlights both what he 
terms the ‘big bang’ of change 
across the region - change that 
we normally associate with 
wars, revolution, and what he terms ‘milestone’ events - and secondly, what 
he regards as the less visible process of steady change. Here he emphasises 
the wider demographic shifts across the Middle East and the so called 
‘youth bulge’ which in Egypt can only expand exponentially with new births 
now exceeding 190,000 per month. He notes too the generational gap that 
increasingly divides Egyptian youth from their parents, a divide that, since 
the Arab uprisings, perhaps has less regard for their country’s political leaders 
who, like the Nasser, had been almost been deified by the Egyptian masses in 
an earlier era. The past truly was another country.
In turn, Korany addresses a wider issue: the potential of social media to 
mobilise people and which did much to puncture the aura of invincibility that 
had for so long, defined autocratic rule with its often-synthetic understanding 
of what was happening on the Arab street. It is therefore the need to understand 
both conceptually and methodologically, the integration of the ‘big bangs’ of 
change, with the more slow-burning shifts in the regional social and economic 
contours that for Barany will give us a better, more balanced understanding of 
change, a change which all too often has been obscured by ‘business as usual’. 
In many ways, his is a provocative thesis and so it should be. One, for 
example, might take issue with Professor Korany’s construct of revolution and 
revolutionary forces; the reductionist nature of youth as opposition while the 
power of social media as a mobilising agent might strike some as exaggerated. 
Even so, his thesis is compelling in both its articulation and insight; he 
certainly pushes both the methodological and conceptual boundaries of how 
we understand the forces that are shaping the MENA region in so many but 
often contradictory ways. For this alone, we are in his debt.
“Business as usual? 
Well, as Bahgat 
Korany of the American 
University of Cairo 
opines in this thought 
provoking article, not 
quite...”
by Clive Jones
analyzing change in The Middle easT
inTrodUcTion1
I was asked to stand up and salute, 
and I’m really glad to be here. 
This is not a routine statement. 
Durham is an important academic 
institution, as I knew long time ago 
and as this was confirmed yesterday 
during my meeting and discussion 
with some faculty and graduate 
students on the 10th anniversary 
Arab Human Development Report. 
On a much personal level, it is also 
a very nice place and I have lots of 
friends, old friends, and luckily the 
colleagues-panellists are also friends. 
In introducing today’s discussion 
on ME Change, Anoush just said 
that the three of us are members of 
Louise’s team of the 4th edition of 
International Relations of the Middle 
East.2 
In addition, I was also keen to come 
because of the topic. Indeed, most 
of the writings and the analyses 
on the ME emphasize continuity, 
really business as usual. After the 
Arab Spring, there was a sort of 
reconsideration, but the mind-set in 
perceiving and conceiving the Middle 
East as rather unchanging or even 
unchangeable leaves its strong traces. 
In fact, this is more or less the first 
conference to emphasize explicitly 
Politics of Change as the title says 
and avoid general terms such as 
reform and the similar. Thus, this 
one-day conference brings to the fore 
and unequivocally the centrality of 
change as such, and I wholeheartedly 
commend the organizers for 
emphasizing this rather under-
researched dimension in the analysis 
of the Middle East.
Indeed, the emphasis on continuity in 
Middle East analyses is both consistent 
and imposing. Methodologically, this 
is understandable since adopting an 
approach emphasizing ‘business as 
usual’ is easier to apply than shooting 
at a moving target. Moreover, the 
neglect of analyzing change has 
become a sort of standard, even for 
policy makers, based on the belief 
that the Middle East does not really 
change. So, I am indeed glad that this 
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School of Government and International Affairs at Durham brings us here and 
invite us to focus on the change dimension during the day. We might disagree 
on some aspects and debate one item here or there, but the organizers are 
commended for putting the item of change high on this conference’s agenda.3 
This could make of this meeting and its presentations/debate a needed 
contribution to ME studies by putting in doubt a comfortable conventional 
wisdom in this field. 
For the emphasis on continuity seems to be, on the surface, very valid. 
Tribalism is still there in its old/new form.4 Think of Yemen, of Libya, even of 
Lebanon, not to talk about Iraq, Bahrain or Qatar. To support the continuity 
thesis, we have at present an important debate in political science about the 
durability of authoritarianism. Increasing literature,5 and it is becoming almost 
a ‘sectarian’ war among analysts. Issues of continuity seem to find support, 
at least on the surface, by looking historically at some other items of ME 
international relations. Doesn’t the Balfour Declaration, with its hundredth 
anniversary in a few months, remind us how eternal the Arab-Israeli conflict 
seem to be with no final settlement in sight?
However, even at this level and if we look much more carefully, some aspects 
of this major conflict have changed substantially at the inter-state level. For 
instance, as inconceivable as it looked 40 years ago, there are now formal 
peace treaties between Egypt and Israel, Jordan and Israel, in addition to the 
Oslo Agreement of mutual recognition between the Palestinians and Israel. 
A few years ago, there were repeated and public negotiations between these 
seemingly arch enemies, Syria and Israel – inconceivable according to official 
rhetoric of a few years earlier. As we talk at present, last news indicates visits, 
declared visits, to Israel by Saudi delegations that seem to confirm Israel’s 
earlier contacts in the Gulf and coordination that predate the 2015-Nuclear 
Agreement with Iran. Briefly, if you look beyond the surface, you will see some 
aspects of change, and major change. 
After all, at the international level, the issue of dealing with change has 
already been prominent. Do not we remember President’s Obama motto for 
his election more than nine years ago: ‘yes we can’, i.e. we can and should 
change. In fact, the vote for the controversial President-elect Donald Trump 
is also associated with change, i.e. a plea for change away from the traditional 
Washington establishment. Much more conceptually, a well-established 
International Relations School such as Realism has one of its pillars, Robert 
Gilpin, devoting one of his classics to the centrality of change against the 
school’s bias in favour of comparative statics in decoding the history of 
international relations.6 Indeed, can we really understand the longue dureé 
of the international system without 
dealing with power-transitions and 
its dynamics?
In the 40 minutes I have, and I want to 
leave time for questions/comments, 
I will be brief focusing very much 
on the analytical aspects and will 
use some major events mainly to 
back up what I claim in order to 
make the point clear. In principle, I 
am focusing mainly on what we can 
call transformative change, not any 
change, but the one that leaves an 
impact. In this respect, conceptually 
and methodologically, I will start 
by making a sort of typology about 
change. I will distinguish between 
two types: on the one hand, the 
visible change, the big bang that we 
cannot afford to ignore; and on the 
other hand, the steady type of change 
that goes underneath but climbs up 
to be cumulative and finally impose 
its effect. I will be as operational as 
possible by specifying components of 
each type of change (3 components 
for the 1st type and 2 for the 2nd 
type) with indicative examples to 
back up my analysis. So, let me start 
by the easy one, the big bang type of 
change and its impact. 
The Big Bang Change and Its Impact: 
I focus here three main components/
drivers of that type of change: 1- 
War, 2- Revolution, and 3- milestone 
events. 
Wars
Wars as drivers of change are easy 
to deal with as they stand out.7 I 
already referred to Gilpin’s classic 
in International Relations theory 
about war and social change. Indeed, 
International Relations theory in 
its different forms, from Classical 
Realism a l’anglaise8 to dominant 
Neo-Realism a l’americaine9 have 
war at its centre of analysis to decode 
the international system. Though 
this over-emphasis on war could 
be reductionist in such (Realist) 
International Relations theory, it 
demonstrates my point. Concerning 
specifically the ME, and in addition 
to the abundant works of diplomatic 
history or application of Realism,10 
Steven Heydemann drew attention to 
the socio-economic aspects of wars 
and their impact.11 We know that 
the contemporary Middle East itself 
owes its present state structure to 
World War I and the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.12 Consequently, 
not only is war basic to the structure 
and evolution of the region, but 
also the region has plenty of it. A 
recent statistic shows that the Arab 
ME constitutes 5.2 % of the world 
population, but is plagued with 17% 
of its conflicts.13 War then is a force of 
change, a recognized game-changer, 
good or bad.
Can we imagine the Middle East 
without the 1948-war, that witnessed 
the establishment of the state of 
Israel and its consequences? ‘What 
If’ – as a new school of history 
suggests - this war did not happen; 
how different the region would have 
been? As basic is the 1956-Suez war, 
which affected the international 
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fortunes of this country that is 
hosting us today, Britain. What the 
Arabs call the Tripartite Aggression 
denotes the plot of France, Britain 
and Israel to attack Egypt following 
the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal. As a result of the revelation of 
this plot, the opposition by the two 
superpowers, moral condemnation in 
the U.N and across most of the world, 
an important result for both the ME 
and the international system was an 
overdue change in the international 
hierarchy: the declassification of both 
France and Britain as recognized great 
powers. A third example of the impact 
of ME wars is the 3rd Arab-Israeli war 
in 1967. The consequences of this 
‘Six-Day War’ are clear in shaping 
the ME. In addition to geopolitical 
effects that go beyond the region, 
it established Israel politically and 
militarily as a regional hegemon; led 
to the lack of credibility of Nasserism 
and Arab unity as a regional ideology 
and foretold the rise of an alternative 
Arab pole: the oil-rich Gulf countries. 
As regards the 1973-October war 
- the 4th Arab-Israeli round – we 
should remember one of its under-
researched impacts: the quadrupling 
of oil prices in the period of a few 
months which confirmed the rise of 
the Gulf pole in regional and world 
politics (as we will see below). In 
fact, each of these wars has been 
analyzed in tens if not hundreds of 
PhD dissertations and thousands of 
books/academic articles inside and 
outside the Middle East. My point is 
thus clear about war as a big driver 
of change and, unfortunately, the 
Middle East has lots of these wars. 
Revolution
Revolution could be conceived 
conceptually and empirically as the 
domestic equivalent of war. This is 
why this game-changer does not 
deserve too much labouring and we 
can go fast in this part. In addition, 
there is abundant primary and 
secondary literature on the different 
revolutionary processes outside 
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East. In a region that is very elitist in structure, this is in itself an impact. 
Whatever our judgment about this event, it certainly has reshaped the 
region. To start with, it led to the disappearance of the Shah with his imperial 
megalomania, and in terms of the ideas, it initiated a new frame of reference. 
The status of Islam has ceased to be identified with a frozen past to become a 
revolutionary force to shape the future, a very profound mental restructuring 
that still impacts the region’s belief- system. 
Nasserism and the Iranian Revolution differ a lot. But both of them have 
shaped the frame of reference of the people deep down. This is what I mean 
by change, it is really a transformation that goes beyond the event, a game-
changer at more than one level. Though the 3rd driver of change, milestone 
event, might not appear at first glance as having the same transformative 
impact, it is still presented here as a big bang. 
Milestone Events
Indeed, these milestone events are less visible than war and revolution. 
Social science literature and political studies have no problem accepting 
our conclusions above about the impact of war and/or revolution as drivers 
of transformative change. Even in the street, when you talk about war and 
revolution, people can easily follow, they do not need to be specialists to 
see and feel the impact of these big bangs, but not the same clarity about 
milestone events. Given their debatable impact, we should start with how I 
define such driver of change. 
They are conceived here as a sort of residual category that it is not a revolution 
or a war, and not characterized by the same level of violence. I will take some 
examples to clarify this point. The above-mentioned hundred-year old Balfour 
Declaration is one milestone event. Much closer in history, all of us remember 
the storming of the Berlin Wall, and then the end of the cold war without war. 
As we all agree, powers have invested so many resources in building nuclear 
arsenals and spent so much time getting worried about the possibility of a 
nuclear war. Many of us felt it was important to discuss in classrooms theories 
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and inside the Middle East.14 For 
instance, Nasserism since the early 
1950s shaped the Middle East, and 
it still does. Lots of people try to 
be complementary to the present 
head of state in Egypt, former 
General El-Sisi and draw analogy 
between him and Nasser. Both of 
them obviously came from the 
military institution and stayed 
connected to it. But beyond this 
superficial analogy, there is a huge 
difference. Nasserism’s impact has 
gone beyond Egypt to shape the 
fate of the region not only in the 
Arab World, but the Middle East 
at large. Take as an example the 
debate in 1955 about the Bagdad 
Pact in the region and the rise of 
non-alignment as an international 
rallying movement across the 
rest of the Third World and even 
Europe.15 As a result, revolutionary 
Egypt and the Nasserist model 
shaped not only the region 
but parts of the world too. For 
instance, following the success of 
the 1959-Cuban revolution, Che 
Guevara came to Egypt and told 
Nasser the impact that his example 
had on revolutionaries in Latin 
America. Similarly, Ali Shariati, 
the ideologue of the 1979-Iranian 
Revolution, confirmed this 
Nasserist inspirational impact.
Indeed, a good second example of 
revolution as a driver of regional 
change is the Iranian Revolution. 
For many, it is seen as the first 
mass-based and Islam-inspired 
successful revolution in the Middle 
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the time, and watched first-hand how all the North American TV channels put 
aside different items, even domestic ones, to focus on this unexpected visit. 
People were in disbelief. I made some interviews, including with the former 
American ambassador in Cairo, Herman Eilts, as he was very close to Sadat 
and they had a sort of hotline between them. He said to me and I quote: ‘when 
I heard the speech, I couldn’t believe it, so I phoned the president right away 
and I said, if it is a slip of the tongue, tell me and then we will try to contain 
its effects’. But President Sadat said ‘no, I meant it, and I meant it literally’.17 
So even an American ambassador who usually has sources and resources to 
know a lot in the region, and was in this specific case so close to Sadat, did 
not know about this event before it happened and could not even believe it 
once it became public. We know the impact of this milestone event from the 
holding of the 13-day 1978-Camp David negotiations, the departure of the 
Arab League from its Cairo headquarters to Tunis, the series of Arab-Israeli 
Peace treaties. 
I can include here also the impact of the Arab Spring as a milestone event. 
Some people might object because its results have been up till now rather 
disappointing. At the other end, some of my students will object to considering 
the Arab Spring a milestone event, preferring instead to put it in the revolution 
category. Though at present in a setback position from Syria to Yemen and at 
more than one level, I believe it certainly impacted different Arab countries, 
including countries that are not its direct theatre of operations. Did not the head 
of Saudi Arabia offer his people right away $36 billion for housing and other 
social demands? Did not the GCC countries invite formally non-Gulf Jordan 
and Morocco to join the monarchical club? The Arab Spring proved the fragility 
of authoritarian regimes, previously deemed all strong. It also ushered in the 
arrival to power through elections of Islamists (and their failure to govern). 
These are important impacts for the region as a whole and even beyond.
The Steady Process of Change
This second type of transformative change is not as visible as the big bang 
since it is usually a steady and even unnoticeable process. This is why it could 
be tricky to identify and confirm, as it is essentially and characteristically 
slow process rather than a newsworthy event. Since this steady process of 
change goes underneath and even deep in society, we tend not to be aware of 
it. Moreover, it takes time to show its impact. It is, however, very cumulative. 
I can even claim that it could be as important as the big bang, often at the 
very basis and engendering many big bangs. For the sake of time-limit, I will 
take two components. One is related to the evolving structure of demography 
characteristic of the region. The other is technological: the wide diffusion of 
the internet and use of social media.
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of deterrence, MAD (mutually assured 
destruction) strategies to alert young 
people to the potential dangers of 
the contemporary world based on 
the balance of terror between the 
superpowers. Yet, this cold war did 
not – fortunately – lead to a hot 
war between the main protagonists 
but ended without one. Given the 
impact of the end of the cold war, 
the storming of the Berlin Wall as a 
milestone event, a game-changer, is 
clear then and now. 
At a different level of analysis, 
another example of a milestone 
event is the election of the first Afro-
American President in the U.S. I was 
very struck when Obama was giving 
his first State of the Union Speech 
and said, ‘not very far from where I 
talk, my father wouldn’t be allowed to 
go into one of the restaurants.’ That 
does show the impact of his arrival 
to the White House nationally, but 
also globally given the influence of 
this socio-political example in a big 
society of the superpower. After all, 
this society has been and continues 
to be marred by instances of racism, 
the Civil Rights movement as well as 
the KKK and tense relations between 
white Americans and their Afro-
American co-citizens. Obama’s 
election goes beyond the slogan ‘yes 
we can’ and becomes highly symbolic 
in American and world history, an 
embodiment of a milestone event. 
Closer to the specific topic of our 
meeting, the Middle East, obviously, 
the oil 1973-Oil embargo has 
its impact as a milestone event. 
Financially, it led to huge petro-dollar 
resources, far beyond the capacity 
of these countries to absorb them 
in a short time. The result is a huge 
investment abroad and arms imports, 
thus influencing the economies of 
such countries and regions as the 
U.S., Japan, Western Europe or Asia. 
In the Middle East itself, petro-dollars 
have impacted directly millions of 
families and their very daily lives. 
For these small but capital-intensive 
oil-exporters started needed and 
huge development projects. As they 
lacked labour resources, abundant 
in neighbouring labour-intensive 
countries, a huge circulation of capital 
and people dominated the Middle 
East since the mid-1970s, giving a 
new meaning to Pan-Arabism. In the 
1950s and 1960s as we remember, 
Nasser tried very hard to establish 
Pan Arabism but failed. In fact, the 
rise (and demise) of the UAR, which 
lasted only for 3 years, embodied 
the failure of the of this statist 
from-above dream. Petro-dollars 
connected people at a different level 
and also in a different context. Arab 
people’s inter-connectedness took 
a huge push through the circulation 
of people and financial remittances 
across the borders of the different 
countries of the Arab World.16 
A fourth example of a milestone event 
is Sadat’s 1977-visit to Jerusalem 
with all its consequences, starting 
with the impact of the surprise itself, 
nationally, regionally and world-
wide. I remember I was in Canada at 
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contest what the old generation is 
doing and saying. In my meeting 
yesterday with some Durham 
students, I told them that one of the 
things that surprised me during the 
Arab Spring is the need for a deeper 
content-analysis of the slogans 
of the protestors. For instance, 
I was struck with where Ben Ali 
and Mubarak - without consulting 
each other – converged and were 
repeating ‘we understand you.’ 
Events proved, however, that for 
sure they didn’t understand them. 
That is what I am talking about as a 
steady change that we don’t see, but 
it is cumulative and self-assertive, 
resulting in a huge impact, in this 
case massive protests that forced 
the two autocrats to give up rule. 
Part of that youth bulge is related 
to gender issues. Women are more 
and more present at this category 
and impacting both the labour 
market and street protests. Their 
increasing presence in this market 
and ‘outside it’ at large show more 
the shortages that the education 
system or the labour market 
have to face. Such shortages 
demonstrate more clearly the 
incapacity of both society and 
government to integrate youth and 
capitalize on these new energies, 
of its youthfulness. Both these 
young men and women represent 
new blood and a huge component 
of innovativeness, of thinking 
out of the box. Such creativity 
dynamics are bound to accelerate 
the process of change, slow but 
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Demography
Concerning demography, the growth rate in the Arab Middle East is far 
above the world average, constituting a serious socio-political challenge in 
many countries, especially the already relatively over-populated. In Algeria, 
Morocco, the Sudan and of course Egypt, the population increase results in 
a yawning gap between population demands and resources available. These 
countries try to practice birth control, but with limited success. The data are 
impressive. Egypt for instance produces almost 190.000 people every month, 
the equivalent of Kuwait’s native population every 6 months or so, is now 
above 92 million, and with a percentage birth rate that is 5 times that of China 
and 8 times that of South Korea, could have 100 million by 2020. This huge 
demographic growth takes place while resources are not increasing but in 
fact dwindling per capita, thus widening the population/resource gap, with a 
potentially negative impact on governance and social peace.
But the impact of this steady demographic change is not only quantitative. 
We take only one aspect in relation to the shape of the demographic pyramid: 
what is identified as the youth bulge, i.e. the increase in the number of the 
people between the 15 and 29 years old.18 This age bracket is at present an 
absolute majority of the Arab population. Many, especially in North America, 
think of young age as an asset. This is because of the increase in the number 
of aging and ailing population / senior or retired citizens, pension funds are 
drying up. Consequently, there is an immediate need for young people to be 
there and work, pay old age contribution and keep the fund renewed and in 
fact going. Unfortunately, in the different parts of the Arab World, youth are 
thought of as a liability, a burden on the education system, burden on the 
labour market, and as a result is we have two negative aspects leading to a 
tense process of change. One element of this tense process is what we can 
call generational divide. If I can include some anecdotal data to drive home 
the impact of this process, I will mention the case of some of my students at 
AUC that claim they don’t at all communicate with their parents, they talk 
but they say ‘we can’t communicate.’ When I meet some of the parents they 
complain that ‘this new generation is not like us,’ and they probably do not 
listen to them. This aspect of generational divide in the Arab World certainly 
contributed to the rise of the Arab Spring and its structure. It can indicate the 
possible return of mass protests. 
Indeed, this youth bulge/generational divide and its imminent impact is 
not only limited to protests about shortages in the labour market but the 
rise of general socio-political protest as a mood. Youth is usually associated 
with rebellion and we can conclude that with the rise in the percentage of 
youth, you are bound to have more and more protest movements, people to 
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Conclusion
I want to conclude here by coming back to that debate between continuity and 
change. The objective is not to deny the presence of elements of continuity. 
It will be absurd to deny that such continuity and that in fact shapes many 
aspects of society and politics. My objective is rather to warn against the danger 
of excessive reductionism in ME studies and analyze almost everything as a 
reflection of such continuity. The plea for emphasizing elements of change 
– both as an unavoidable big bang or a creeping cumulative process – is an 
attempt to bring balance in ME studies and the actual analysis of the region.
Such restructuring of our conceptual lenses is needed not only methodologically, 
conceptually and especially epistemologically but has also policy relevance. 
Though most people would continue to emphasize continuity because it is 
easier, business as usual, if we want really to cope with the increasing issues 
that are dominating the Middle East at present, emphasis on elements of 
change as a mind-set have to be integrated. We have to think primarily and 
consistently in terms of dialectics between continuity and change, not only as 
parallel processes but better as overlapping and interacting. I would even say 
that I would prefer to start with change because this is the biggest challenge 
in order to deal with policy issues. We have to switch our mindsets to focus on 
change, to direct our conceptual lens to watch what is changing rather than 
what is going on as usual. In this way, we can decode properly what is taking 
place on the ground. Even better, we might be so qualified to see ‘surprise’ 
events before they take place and cope with them in the most relevant way. 
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still transformative, and tense if 
authorities do not how to cope with 
it. Consequently, their presence is not 
only a quantitative aspect, but also a 
qualitative one. They ‘technologize’ 
society and its processes through 
social media. Aided by globalization, 
their ‘virtual’ inter-connectedness 
spills over in social movements far 
beyond borders.19 
ICT
Indeed, another example of steady 
change, closely related to youth, is 
ICT which is at the basis of the huge 
increase in the use of the internet and 
social media.20 For instance, internet 
penetration is soaring across the 
Arab Middle East. Between 2013 and 
2016, it rose in Egypt from 22% to 
59%, and in Lebanon even more: from 
58% to 84%. Though this increase 
embraces all groups, as expected the 
increase is the greatest among youth. 
Thus 93% of those in the age bracket 
18-24-year-old are likely to use it, 
compared 85% to those 24-34-year-
old, 72% of 34-44 years old and 39% of 
those 45 years and older.21 Moreover 
‘smartphone ownership tracks 
closely with internet penetration… 
Nearly all nationals in the Gulf states 
and Lebanon use a smartphone: nine 
in 10 or more-compared to 43% of 
Tunisians and 61% of Egyptians’.22 
Not surprisingly, youth are again in 
the lead: ‘89% of nationals 18 to24 
years old own smartphones compared 
to 85% of 25 to 34-year-olds, 71% of 
35 to 44-year-olds and only 49% of 
those 45 years or older’.23 
Data about social media networking 
such as Facebook and WhatsApp 
confirm this youth-heavy 
involvement, even higher than their 
already high demographic ratio in 
society. This massively youth-used 
medium allows the dissemination of 
information in the most-censored 
societies, snowballing change as 
this actually happened in the Arab 
Spring.24 The internet and other 
forms of social media become, as 
Abdulla nicely put it, an onshore 
agent of (democratic) change.25 It is 
worth quoting the example in detail:
Israa Abdel-Fattah, a twenty-
year old woman who formed a 
group called the ‘April 6 Youth 
Movement’ to rally support for 
workers in the Egyptian city of 
Mahalla Al-Kubra, who were 
planning a demonstration on 6 
April2008. Abdel-Fattah asked 
people simply to stay at home 
that day, not to go to work, and 
not to engage in any monetary 
transactions such as buying or 
selling. To her own surprise, Abdel 
Fattah’s group attracted some 
73,000 members and caused much 
havoc among national security 
forces on the 6th of April. She was 
dubbed ‘the Facebook girl’ and 
‘the president of the Facebook 
Republic…’26 
The 6th of April Movement was the 
main actor in mobilizing youth and 
the country at large to initiate Egypt’s 
Arab Spring on Jan. 25th, 2011.27 
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foreword
There can be few people more qualified than Professor Giacomo Luciani to 
address the political economy of change in the MENA region. A distinguished 
economist and adjunct professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, he is 
also a scientific advisor for the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences 
Po in Paris and a Princeton University Global Scholar. His career has included 
working for the Italian Ministry of Finance, directing a number of notable 
research institutes in the Gulf as well as Europe, assisting development 
planning for the Saudi government, and being a member of the Oxford, Geneva 
and Paris Energy Clubs. Thus, his 
knowledge and experience uniquely 
traverses the academic and practice-
based energy industries, always with 
an eye to the complex inter-linkages 
of political and economic realms. 
In this paper, he offers the particular 
observation that we can understand 
the wave of popular uprisings and 
protest movements across the region 
since 2011 – possibly the most large-
scale and visible evidence of change 
for a generation - as being essentially 
the result of the diminished 
circulation of oil rent that has marked 
the region since the early 1990s. For 
Luciani, oil rent has been the blood 
of the regional body-politic, carried 
largely by regional labour migration 
flows, and somewhat less through 
inter-Arab foreign aid, in the period 
from 1970 to 1990. 
“his knowledge 
and experience 
uniquely traverses 
the academic and 
practice-based 
energy industries, 
always with an 
eye to the complex 
inter-linkages 
of political and 
economic realms...”
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Although the distribution was 
uneven and deeply politicised, 
these flows sustained politics 
at the national levels, 
albeit without necessarily 
establishing particular 
stabilities. The expulsion of 
Arab labour from Saddam’s Iraq, 
and the subsequent regional 
preference for labour migrants 
from the Asian sub-continent, 
dramatically exacerbated the 
structural flaws of corrupt, 
cronyistic economies, widening 
inequalities and prompting a 
whole new scale of instability 
– manifesting now in what 
Luciani describes as a region-
wide civil war. 
It is not a happy picture, and one which may be deeply contested by those 
observers who take a less structuralist, more agency-focused approach. 
Nonetheless, as the hydrocarbon-rich countries themselves seem intent on 
pursuing their own rival visions for the region’s future through competitive 
sponsorship of the regimes leading the most distressed political economies 
(Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria) and their opponents, rather than through reviving 
the economic capillaries of labour remittances and large-scale aid, it seems 
that the regional circulation of rent will remain constricted, politicised, and 
dysfunctional for a good while longer. 
Luciani leads us to conclude that regional economic functionality is unlikely 
to be restored and political instability will remain a defining characteristic of 
the region. Whether and how this will extend into the next cycle of oil price 
rises is yet to be seen. 
“Luciani leads us to 
conclude that regional 
economic functionality 
is unlikely to be 
restored and political 
instability will 
remain a defining 
characteristic of the 
region...”
by Emma Murphy
The PoliTical econoMy of change in Mena
inTrodUcTion1
The economics of change in MENA 
cannot be separated from the politics 
of it, be it at the level of the single 
state or at that of the MENA region as 
a whole. In turn, the politics of change 
in the region cannot be understood 
without proper consideration of 
economic and political economy 
factors. 
The central variable in the 
relationship remains the oil rent, 
and its circulation within the major 
oil exporting countries as well as 
regionally. Much has been written 
to refine or adapt the rentier state 
paradigm to changing circumstances,1 
and undoubtedly change has occurred 
at all levels in the region, mandating 
a constant revision of our tools of 
analysis. 
Nevertheless, the key statement of 
the rentier state paradigm - i.e. that 
access to an important flow of rent, 
accruing directly to the state from 
the rest of the world, fundamentally 
influences political dynamics at 
the single state as well as regional 
levels - remains widely accepted and 
confirmed by empirical observation.2
Oil exports are not the only significant 
source of rent in the region, but 
remain by far the most important. 
The importance of the rent accruing 
to each state is of course a function of 
the volume of exports; but also, and 
for many years primarily, it has been 
a function of changes in oil prices. 
The absolute level of rent accruing to 
each state is important, but variations 
over time due to shifts in prices, and 
the regional distribution of the rent 
are no less important.
The rentier state approach is 
frequently accused of being static, 
inasmuch it proposes that the 
availability of rent from oil exports 
consolidates the existing power 
structure. The paradigm predicts 
that whoever is in power at the 
outset of access to the rent will have 
a strong opportunity to keep power. 
This statement justifies stability but 
does not allow us to understand how 
things might ever change. Indeed, the 
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theory has a problem understanding change, but only if the analysis is limited 
to the implications of rent circulation at the level of a single country. There 
can be no doubt that the availability of the oil rent has allowed otherwise 
anachronistic patrimonial regimes in the Gulf to remain in power, while 
normally they should have been wiped out a long time ago. The fact that this 
region has, so far, essentially escaped the heritage of the French Revolution 
can only be explained with consideration to the availability of the oil rent. 
But at the same time one must also consider the regional dimension: at the 
regional dimension, change cannot be pre-empted in the same fashion as 
domestically, and it is from the regional dimension that eventually change 
will come also to the Gulf monarchies. 
Oil Price Cycles
Changes in oil prices are the most important engine of regional change. We 
may organize recent regional history in four main periods, based on changes 
in oil prices and, even more so, perceptions and expectations surrounding 
oil prices. Each period extended over approximately 15 years, and one 
could advance an empirical theory of medium term oil prices based on such 
historically observed periods (see chart). 
Above: 15-year oil price cycles
The first cycle may be considered 
to have covered the period between 
1955 and 1970 – a period of very low 
and declining prices. In this period, 
OPEC was formed but did not succeed 
in influencing prices, which remained 
firmly under the control of the major 
international oil companies. MENA 
countries rapidly expanded their 
production and exports, but low 
prices limited the importance of the 
rent accruing to them, and in most 
cases, they had limited financial 
resources.
The turning point came in 1970 with 
the Tehran-Tripoli agreements. 1970 
is one year after Muammar Gaddafi 
comes to power in Libya, and he was 
very much instrumental, together 
with the Shah, in turning the tide 
and reversing the power relationship 
between oil companies and producing 
countries. Prices increased initially 
only a little, but after 1973 the 
increase became rapid. A second jump 
in prices occurred as a consequence 
of the Iranian revolution. The 
conviction that oil prices would 
remain high or increased further 
lasted until the early 1980’s, and was 
only reversed in 1985. Thus 1970-85 
is the second cycle, and it was a high 
oil price period. Prices were far from 
stable, but the oil rent exploded and 
engulfed the entire region.
This period was concluded in 1985, 
when Saudi Arabia abandoned the 
defence of the official OPEC price and 
opted for defending its market share. 
This shift inaugurated a 15-year 
sequence of predominantly moderate 
prices, lasting until about year 2000. 
The last two years of this period saw 
especially low prices, prompting 
some cooperation between OPEC and 
non-OPEC producers: in 2000 prices 
recover, but the recovery remains 
hesitant until the spring of 2004. This 
is due to the expectation that the 
2003 US intervention in Iraq would 
open the door to a rapid increase in 
Iraqi production, possibly even to Iraq 
exiting OPEC. In the spring of 2004 it 
became clear that neither expectation 
would be fulfilled, so prices started 
climbing rapidly. A speculative 
bubble was formed which burst in the 
summer of 2008. Prices collapsed in 
the second half of 2008 but recovered 
rather quickly the following year, 
and remained above $100 per barrel 
between 2010 and the summer of 
2014. In 2014 a new abrupt shift in 
the market occurred: prices collapsed 
and are now down to something like 
$50 per barrel, or a little more. If my 
empirical observation is correct, the 
next appointment is for 2030, and 
then we might see a new period of 
high prices. For the time being, we 
are in for a period of low prices, which 
can reasonably be expected to last for 
some time. 
Impact of Oil Price Cycles
Keeping this periodization in mind, we 
see that the period 1970 to 1985 saw 
major regional changes. The onset of 
the oil rent undoubtedly completely 
transformed the region in two main 
ways. The first is that the patrimonial 
monarchies were consolidated, which 
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is something that we might consider 
normal today, but was not at all a 
foregone conclusion at the time – in 
fact the monarchies were severely 
challenged from the more powerful 
regional republics, notably Egypt and 
Iraq. This was the effect underlined 
by the rentier state paradigm.
But there was also a second main 
impact, this one at the regional level, 
as the pecking order of power and 
influence of individual states within 
the region completely changed. This 
is the fundamental and always valid 
message of the book by Malcolm Kerr 
and Elsayyed Yassin Rich and Poor 
States in the Middle East,3 which 
underlined the fact that previously 
the region was mostly dominated by 
countries with large populations, and 
large and powerful armies; but after 
1970 power shifted to the major oil 
exporters. Previously power resided 
in the barrel of a gun, and then 
it shifted to a barrel of oil, i.e. to 
countries that are relatively small for 
population, and rich in oil. 
Did abundant oil money bring 
stability? Usually we are associating 
high oil prices with political stability, 
low oil prices with potential political 
instability. This is however not fully 
confirmed by the historical record: 
while it is undeniable that oil money 
consolidated the Gulf monarchies, 
elsewhere in the region numerous 
episodes of instability occurred. The 
Lebanese Civil war (1975-1989); 
the Iranian Revolution (1978-9); 
the peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel (1979), marking the political 
isolation of the former from the rest 
of the Arab region; the Iraq/Iran 
war (1980-88), which defined the 
regional cleavage between Sunni 
and Shi’a, and has long-standing 
consequences to this date; and 
Sadat’s assassination (1981), which 
is one of the early manifestations of 
Islamic terrorism in the region: all of 
the above occurred during a period of 
high oil rent availability.
During this period of time, 1970 
to 1985, the oil rent was circulated 
Above: Professor Luciani speaking at the relaunch of IMEIS, Durham
on regional dynamics: for the oil-producing countries of the Gulf reliance on 
expatriate labour is a necessity because it is an essential tool to resist the so-
called Dutch Disease. If the major Gulf exporters did not rely on expatriate 
labour, their wage level would rise very rapidly and discourage the development 
of any other productive activity. 
So, if the oil exporting countries are seeking diversification - and I believe 
that this has always been the goal of all the Gulf countries, with the possible 
exception of Kuwait - they cannot rely exclusively on their domestic workforce. 
They need to import workers and human capital from elsewhere. It makes a 
huge difference whether you import that human capital from the region, and 
in this way, activate a regional circulation of the rent; or in contrast, you rely 
on people that come from more distant lands, and especially politically non-
related lands. In 1990 the equilibrium between regional and extra-regional 
labour movements changed radically. Until 1990 there was an emphasis on 
regional integration, thereafter this was very much limited. 
The rentier state theory predicted that the period of low prices would lead 
to greater demand for political participation and democracy, and this in fact 
did occur. In 1988 riots erupted in Algeria, setting in motion a process of 
democratic transition.6 The case of Algeria is especially interesting because, 
as is known, the democratic transition eventually failed. The door was then 
opened to an extremely bloody civil war, in which up to 200,000 people might 
have lost their life. This traumatic experience is still vivid in the memory of 
many Algerians and, one may surmise, goes a long way towards explaining 
why Algeria was not engulfed by the Arab Spring twenty years later.
But what is more significant for my analysis is that the Algerian riots and 
subsequent civil war did not set in motion a process of regional imitation. 
One should well note the difference between the situation of the late 1980s 
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“The rentier state theory 
predicted that the period of 
low prices would lead to 
greater demand for political 
participation and democracy...”
throughout the region, not just 
within the oil exporting countries. 
Regional circulation of the rent was 
based primarily on the movement 
of labour, which expanded rapidly 
and had profound social and 
economic consequences on sending 
as well as receiving countries.4 
In this phase, employment 
opportunities in the oil exporting 
countries were filled primarily by 
expatriates from neighbouring 
Arab countries. Official aid 
transfers also contributed to 
the regional circulation of the 
rent: the oil exporting countries 
engaged in just simply transferring 
large sums of money to the other 
countries in the region, especially 
those considered to be ‘front-
line states’ in the conflict with 
Israel. The combination of these 
two mechanisms translated into 
effective circulation of the rent at 
the regional level, and all countries 
became rentier.5 However, when 
prices started declining, official 
transfers dried up rather quickly. 
In the following period (1985-
2000) another defining episode 
took place, that is, the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait on the part of 
Iraq. Saddam’s gamble completely 
changed the picture of regional 
rent circulation, because it led 
to the massive expulsion of Arab 
immigrants from the oil producing 
countries, and the substitution 
with primarily Asian labour in all 
of them, albeit at different levels 
of intensity. This had huge impact 
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various subsidies schemes; and creation of state-owned enterprises. The use 
of these tools allowed extraordinary societal mobility, opening the doors to 
an opportunities revolution for the vast majority of the people. Not a few 
intelligent Gulfians went from humble origins in the desert to positions of 
responsibility and economic well-being, and even the privileged members of 
the merchant class went from being small merchants to millionaires if not 
billionaires.
Expenditure on infrastructure and housing loans turned villages into 
metropolises and accompanied a rapid process of urbanization. Education was 
available to younger generations, although not all profited from it; and health 
care brought about remarkable increase in life expectancy. Electrification 
allowed access to air conditioning even in remote areas. State-owned and 
private business grew offering meaningful employment to many. But by 2000 
this early transformation phase was over. The new elites consolidated and 
ossified, blocking the way or limiting the progress for the new generations. 
The bureaucracy became bloated and grossly inefficient, jobs could not be 
offered to all new entrants. Excessively rapid expansion of secondary and 
tertiary schooling led to decreasing quality and frustrations. Adding lanes to 
existing highways did not have the same impact as the initial establishment 
of paved roads.
Yet, as said, the Gulf governments were unable to devise new tools for rent 
circulation. They insisted on subsidies, notably fuel and electricity subsidies, 
which are notoriously regressive.9 They insisted on infrastructure investment 
(Saudi Arabia was advertising 600 billion worth of projects, inviting foreign 
companies to invest and share in the new bonanza), which mostly benefitted 
contractors. Even visionary schemes such as the King Abullah international 
scholarship program, which supported more than a hundred thousand young 
Saudis to study abroad, in the end touched only a minority. Even support for 
the private sector became a boomerang. Much private money was invested in 
real estate speculation, building glitzy commercial centres and housing for the 
rich, while supply of lower cost housing fell behind. The existence of poverty 
was officially recognised but not much was done to reabsorb it.
Polarization of Incomes
To make a long story short, the redistributive power of the traditional ways 
of spending and circulating the oil rent within the oil exporting countries 
diminished. Distances between the extremely wealthy, the growing number 
of businessmen who are in the Forbes billionaires list from the region, and 
the persistent number of marginalised citizens who really are not in any sense 
participating in the bonanza, grew further. Little was done also to address 
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and that of 2010, when, in contrast, 
the eruption of a protest in one 
country immediately led to parallel 
movements throughout the region. 
Indeed, the most striking feature of the 
Arab Spring was the regional spread 
of the phenomenon, and especially 
the extraordinary rapidity with which 
it occurred. This entails that the 
Arab Spring must be interpreted as 
a regional phenomenon, albeit with 
national specificities, and justified 
with region-wide causes.7 
The Second Oil Boom
In searching for a regional 
interpretation, it is inevitable to 
focus on the way in which individual 
countries in MENA reacted to period 
of high prices which began in 2000, 
or, more clearly, in 2004, and ended 
in 2014. Throughout this period of 
rapidly increasing and then stable and 
high prices instability at the regional 
level increased systematically.
The period was inaugurated by the 
September 11, 2001 attacks against 
the International Trade Center 
in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, which led to the US 
intervention in Afghanistan and 
then Iraq. The latter, as mentioned 
already, failed to bring about the 
hoped for democratic government 
and increase in Iraqi oil production, 
setting in motion the oil price bubble 
which culminated in 2008. Iraq has 
not recovered political stability yet; 
then in 2010 the eruption of the Arab 
Spring contributed to maintaining oil 
prices at a high level by creating the 
perception of an imminent threat to 
oil supplies (which was exaggerated, 
but justified higher prices in the eyes 
of market operators).
How can we justify such increased 
instability in the face of rising prices 
and abundant access to oil revenues? 
While the terrorist attacks of 2001 
and the subsequent intervention in 
Iraq cannot be logically attributed 
to higher prices – the direction of 
causation rather being opposite: 
from instability to higher prices – 
when it comes to the Arab Spring 
a strong case can be made that not 
high oil revenues per se, but the 
insufficient and ineffective tools for 
rent circulation both domestically 
in the major exporting countries and 
regionally between the latter and the 
rest of the region played a major role 
in the wave of discontent and revolt.
In fact, the major oil exporters were 
unable to devise new tools for rent 
circulation and fell back on the use 
of old ones. These had proved quite 
effective in the previous high-rent 
phase (1970-85) but were not equally 
so in the second high-rent phase 
(2000-2014).8 
This point deserves detailed 
discussion. In the first phase the 
main tools for rent circulation 
were government employment; 
expenditure on infrastructure and 
housing; provision of basic social 
services, such as primary and 
secondary education, health services, 
access to electricity and water; 
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exact size of the income and wealth 
of individuals in the top centile are 
notoriously difficult to estimate, 
especially in jurisdictions in which 
wealth may not be taxed at all, 
and evasion from income tax very 
widespread.
The economies of the oil-poor 
countries in the region were 
disproportionately controlled by 
a very small group of politically 
connected and crony capitalists, 
who was able to court GCC 
capital, and posed themselves 
as the intermediaries between 
private investors in the GCC, and 
opportunities for investment in 
Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, even 
Syria. The investment projects 
that the crony capitalists pursued 
in association with Gulf investors 
tended to mimic the Dubai model: 
high-scale residential and hospitality 
projects, and financial services. These 
investment projects catered to the 
lifestyles of the globally connected 
élites and their members in the 
region, a strategy that has paid off very 
well in Dubai, but the multiplication 
and imitation of the same model 
cannot replicate the same success. 
It is certainly not a model that is 
capable of offering employment 
to large numbers of workers in the 
country where it is implemented, 
nor supporting important ancillary 
activities. It frequently tends to 
swell the numbers of extra-regional 
expatriates rather than offering 
opportunities to nationals.
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“Penetration 
of advanced 
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the grievances of discriminated minorities such as the Shi’a of the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia (or majorities, such as the Shi’a of Bahrain).
Discontent, albeit muted, easily converged with extremist Islamist tendencies 
calling for armed resistance in Iraq and later in Syria, well supported financially 
by private sources from the Gulf through unofficial channels. Hence, while 
Saudi Arabia managed to contain, but not eliminate, terrorism at home, large 
numbers of young Saudis went to fight proxy wars elsewhere in the region.
At the broader regional level, there was no revival of the rent circulation 
mechanisms of the past, and in particular of intra-regional movements of 
labour. The major oil exporters did not go back to the model of issuing grants 
to other countries, nor gave the same emphasis to public regional investment 
as had done in the 1970s and early ’80s. 
In the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, i.e. in countries that have little 
or no oil available for export, the record of the first decade of this century 
was one of satisfactory but not exceptional GDP growth, and the latter was 
not accompanied by significant trickle down. It has been dubbed ‘unhappy 
growth’. In this respect the experience of MENA, it’s no different from that 
of the rest of the world. Growing inequality has become a global concern, 
whose responsibility is attributed to globalization and increasingly cutthroat 
competition between individuals, companies and governments. Technological 
progress also led to drastic reduction of employment in some better-paying 
services. The oil-exporting countries of MENA are in fact fully integrated 
into the globalization process, while having limited interactions with their 
immediate neighbours. Their exports are global, their economies are open, 
their wage rates kept low through massive employment of expatriates from 
some of the lowest-wage countries. Penetration of advanced technology has 
been intense.
Income distribution worsened in parallel in the non-oil exporting countries of 
the region.10 If we just look at the official statistics, it appears that the indices 
of income concentration have not increased significantly during this period, 
however this result is obtained because those indices are based on deciles and 
the growing concentration is not immediately evident when the population is 
divided in deciles, because differences have grown especially at the top end of 
the distribution, within the top decile, notably between the top 1% of income and 
wealth and the rest of the population. The top 1% owns a very disproportionate 
amount of the wealth and receives an equally disproportionate share of the 
income; distances have grown even within the top centile as only a very small 
elite managed to profit from whatever economic growth was achieved.11 The 
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even actively organized the military coup that brought Al Sisi to power. Thus, 
we witness a discrepancy between political and economic forces. Political 
forces are regional, because they are organised at the regional level; and 
political dynamics increasingly are regional. In contrast, economics forces are 
increasingly outward oriented, globalized, rather than attracted by a process 
of regional economic integration. 
As a consequence, we also find that economic change and political change do 
not proceed in parallel. It is undeniable that the economies of several MENA 
countries have been radically transformed in the fifty years since the onset 
of the oil rent. Not all money was wasted: real, human and financial assets 
were accumulated, and opportunities for further development today are much 
better than they were in the past. The extent of the economic transformation 
may not be sufficient yet to guarantee the prosperity of the major exporters 
beyond the ‘oil era’, yet substantial progress has been made.
However, when we look at the politics of the region we see that the salient 
phenomenon today is income and wealth polarisation, which has led to the 
Arab Spring. The Spring, like many revolutions in history, has in turn led 
to civil war. The latter is being fought actively in four countries, Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen and Libya, but these should not be understood as four separate civil 
wars independent of each other. What we witness is in fact a regional civil 
war. All countries are involved, directly or indirectly. The future of the region 
primarily depends on the outcome of the civil war: it is hardly conceivable 
that consequences might not be felt in each and every country in the region.
We can identify four main forces that are involved in the fighting at the 
regional level, plus several forces that are active at the local level. The first 
main cleavage is that pitting Sunni against Shi’a. The Shi’a camp is led by 
Iran, although it would be a mistake to interpret all Shi’a forces outside Iran 
to be mere Iranian agents, which Tehran may control at will. It is less clear 
who leads the Sunni camp, because the latter is divided into at least three 
components: the first is the moderate Islamists, whose main manifestation is 
the Moslem Brotherhood; the second is the Salafi or extremist Islamists, whose 
main current manifestation is ISIS, yet have a history of resurrection from the 
ashes of previous manifestations, and are not going to disappear even if ISIS 
is militarily routed; and the third component is the traditional rulers, who 
claim an Islamic legitimacy, but in fact do not enjoy the full acceptance of the 
Islamic ‘umma – for several reasons, including that their legitimacy cannot go 
beyond the borders of their respective independent states, and their claims 
conflict with each other at the regional level.
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Thus, income concentration 
increased domestically in both oil 
exporters and non-oil exporters in 
the region; furthermore, distances 
also grew regionally between the two 
groups of countries, exacerbating the 
contrast between oil-rich and oil-
poor states in MENA. GDP per capita 
is the figure that is more commonly 
referred to, but this metric divides 
the gross domestic product by the 
total number of residents, including 
expatriates. It would be more 
appropriate to rely on a metric of 
gross national income per national, 
in which only income accruing to 
nationals would be included and 
divided by the number of nationals 
rather than residents. Distances 
measured in GDP per capita already 
are very large: taking year 2011, GDP 
per capita in Qatar was close to USD 
90,000, while in Yemen it was USD 
1.300; if only the income of nationals 
divided by their number were 
considered, difference would be even 
larger. To poor Egyptians, Yemenis or 
Tunisians who watch Gulf-based TV 
channels and are constantly exposed 
to the display of Gulfian successes 
and lifestyles, the difference is clear 
independently of any sophisticated 
statistical analysis.
Yet, no effective revival of regional 
rent circulation mechanisms took 
place, because the countries of 
the Gulf are primarily interested 
in the global orientation of their 
economies. They pursue investment 
projects in petrochemicals or other 
energy intensive industries have a 
global, not a regional market; their 
objective is not exporting to Egypt, 
Syria or Yemen, it is rather exporting 
to the world. GCC private investors 
have a global outlook as well: they do 
invest in the region, but only to the 
extent that they can find promising 
opportunities; otherwise they are 
equally able and keen to invest 
in Chile, in Vietnam, in Romania, 
anywhere in the world where 
opportunities are found. 
Economically Disintegrated, But a 
Single Political Sphere
Thus, the period of high oil prices 
exacerbated a process of regional 
economic disintegration, growing 
distances and diminishing ties of 
mutual interest. In contrast, at 
the political level the region has 
progressively come closer, and should 
today be viewed as constituting a single 
political sphere. Indeed, in MENA all 
domestic politics are regional, and all 
regional politics are domestic, in the 
sense that there cannot be a change 
in one country that does not have an 
immediate impact on the rest of the 
countries in the region. Therefore, it 
is impossible for these countries and 
regimes to abide by the rule of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of 
their neighbours.
If we do not accept that the region 
in fact constitutes a single political 
sphere, we cannot understand why, 
for example, the election in Egypt 
of a President from the Moslem 
Brotherhood was perceived as 
a mortal threat in the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia, so much so that both 
countries supported and possibly 
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of labour, and reduced dependence on extra-regional expatriates. This would 
quickly reopen the channels of regional circulation of the oil rent, knowing 
that the latter is likely to remain much less important than it has been in the 
period 2000-2014. Regional cross-investment and trade liberalization should 
also finally be pursued – lip service has been paid to these for decades, but 
progress was consistently blocked by political conflicts. Of course, reliance on 
regional labour movements is especially touchy from the political point of view, 
and historically was cut back because of political concerns in association with 
regional developments. Thus, only true regional reconciliation can open the 
door to a new phase of economic integration; a simple freezing of conflicts or 
cold peace would not suffice.
At present the prospect of regional reconciliation appear remote. The 
immediate consequence is seen in the pressure from refugees and economic 
migrants to escape towards Europe and possibly North America. This is a 
way of exporting regional conflicts, and eventually draw Europe and the 
Unites States into the civil war with involvement even more direct than they 
have already. We have seen this happen many times in the past, with little 
constructive outcome. Russia is now very directly involved in Syria, and it is 
difficult to understand what in the end it may gain from this involvement: the 
prospect of restoring Bashar el Assad to a position of accepted leader of the 
country is unattainable.
Yet, being indifferent is also not an option, again because of pressure from 
human movements. The only solution is to search for compromises between 
at least three of the four main forces, excluding the Salafists, whose doctrine 
is essentially incompatible with regional pacification. Once again, much will 
depend on the dynamics of the oil rent. Low oil prices already are straining 
budgets and forcing a rethinking of objectives. The UAE and Saudi Arabia can 
see very clearly that their support for the al Sisi regime in Egypt has brought 
little if any advantage, and involvement in the war in Yemen is little short 
of catastrophic. Already this has brought about a strange accommodation 
between the main Arab Gulf exporters Iran and Russia to limit oil production 
and encourage higher oil prices: will this goal be reached? 
There are strong reasons to doubt that the production agreement will in fact 
be respected by all, and even if so that it will be enough to get the hoped-for 
price outcome. If the oil rent stays low, the pressure for resolving regional 
conflicts will intensify. But that may lead to a mere scaling down of hostilities, 
a cease-fire rather than genuine regional peace: not enough to set the needed 
process of regional integration in motion. The dawn of pragmatism is not in 
sight yet.
67
These four forces are currently 
battling each against all other, and 
no sign of a possible compromise 
or alliance between any two of 
them is visible. Other forces are 
also at play, some local, like the 
Kurds or other ethnic or religious 
minorities; some external, notably 
outside powers such as Russia 
or Turkey. But no outside force 
can dictate the outcome of the 
regional civil war, and no one of 
the four main forces involved can 
prevail unless some compromise 
and alliance between at least two 
of them emerges. Some pit their 
hopes in the educated, globalized 
and potentially liberal professional 
and business elite, but electoral 
exercises have demonstrated time 
and again that this component 
has very limited popular traction, 
and is condemned to defeat 
whenever democracy is given a 
change. Hence liberal instincts are 
frequently muted and members 
of this elite prefer to take cover 
behind authoritarian rulers, in the 
hope, or delusion, that their advice 
can turn into real influence and 
make a difference.
What Future for MENA’s 
Economies?
For the root causes of the civil war to 
be addressed, it would be necessary 
to create political conditions 
that will allow a new phase of 
regional economic integration. The 
centrepiece of such development 
would need to be a reopening of the 
doors to intra-regional movements 
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“Thus, we witness 
a discrepancy 
between political 
and economic 
forces...”
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foreword
The uprisings that swept across the Middle East in 2011 promised a political 
transformation as significant as that of 1989—the velvet revolution that 
brought down the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The economic stagnation 
of the region, the failures of corrupt and repressive regimes, conjoined with 
a disenchanted youthful population wired together as never before, triggered 
a political struggle few anticipated. Yet, almost from the outset, there was a 
lack of a common vision for the transformation of the political regimes and 
the wider the Middle East. The initial peaceful demonstrations in Tunis and 
Cairo quickly gave way to a messy and 
uncertain pathway of transition. A few 
years on the contagious revolutionary 
fervor faded as successor regimes 
failed to deliver quick or lasting 
improvements in living standards, 
the quality of life and governance. 
Moreover, the brutal civil war in 
Syria, the radicalization of militia 
groups in Libya, and discrediting 
of the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
governing alternative in Egypt all 
strengthened the forces resisting 
change throughout the region. The 
removal of Mohammed Morsi from 
the Egyptian Presidency in July 2013 
and consequent reinstatement of 
military-led rule encapsulated the 
stunning reversion to the status 
quo ante in the Arab world’s most 
populous nation.
In 1989 the movements of Central and Eastern Europe by and large shared 
an ambition to topple their governments and replace them with Western 
“almost from 
the outset, there 
was a lack of a 
common vision for 
the transformation 
of the political 
regimes and the 
wider the Middle 
East...”
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European forms of democracy, 
the entrenchment of human 
rights and the benefits of 
consumer-led economic 
growth. As the direction of 
travel was in western interests, 
governments in Europe and 
North America wholeheartedly 
welcomed them. By contrast, 
the signifier ‘democracy’ 
carried much more complex 
meaning in the Arab world in 
2011. This was because the West had propped up most of the Arab autocrats, 
seemed to switch sides to support the peoples seeking change only in the 
cynical last minutes, led a war against terrorism largely in the Arab world, 
which was perceived by young Arabs across the Middle East as imperialism in 
yet another manifestation. Against this background, democracy appeared all 
too readily as a veil masking the shifting tide of western geopolitical interests, 
propping up authoritarian leaders in the name of ‘stability,’ commercial and 
oil concerns, and support for Israel’s security. 
The factors underpinning the weakening of the Arab Spring and its subsequent 
usurpation by anti-revolutionary forces from within and outside the Middle 
East were complex and various. In his wonderful essay that follows, Karim 
Mezran, explores the comparative experiences of four North African countries 
– Algeria and Morocco, Libya and Tunisia – in order to shed light on the 
extent, if any, of the political and economic changes that have taken place. 
He also illuminates what these countries might have done to better achieve 
sustainable outcomes, now and in the future
“the signifier 
‘democracy’ carried 
much more complex 
meaning in the Arab 
world in 2011...”
by David Held
PoliTical change in norTh africa afTer The araB sPring 
inTrodUcTion1
It is now almost six years since the 
political uprisings began in North 
Africa. The protestors demanded 
fundamental political and economic 
changes in the systems that were 
in existence in the countries of the 
region for several decades. Enough 
time has now passed to make an 
assessment of how much change 
has in fact occurred and determine 
whether the countries in North Africa 
have been successful in meetings the 
demands of their populations that 
erupted in the beginning of 2011.
An examination of the comparative 
experiences of four North African 
countries – Algeria, Libya, Morocco, 
and Tunisia – can shed some light 
on the extent of the political and 
economic changes that have taken 
place.2 While all four countries 
faced similar economic and political 
challenges, they adopted differing 
approaches to address them. The key 
question is what these approaches 
were and how successful were the 
countries in achieving their objectives. 
A careful analysis of the political and 
economic developments since 2011 in 
each of them can provide answers to 
this question, as well as provide some 
lessons for the future. In particular, 
with the benefit of hindsight one can 
determine what the countries should 
have done to achieve their goals and 
what challenges remain for them in 
the future. 
Economic and Political 
Developments up to 2010: 
Economic Developments 
The economies of Algeria, Libya, 
Morocco, and Tunisia are dissimilar 
in some important respects, but at the 
same time face quite similar problems 
and challenges. Algeria and Libya are 
oil-dominated economies, where oil 
production and movements in world 
oil prices drive the economy. Tunisia 
and Morocco are more diversified 
and depend on agriculture, tourism, 
manufacturing, and mining. But 
they are also exposed to exogenous 
shocks and external developments 
that impact on tourism flows, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and workers’ 
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remittances. The main common characteristic in these countries, albeit in 
varying degrees, is that the state plays a large role in the functioning of the 
economies. 
Macroeconomic performance in the decade up to 2010, while not stellar, 
averaged between 4 and 4.5 percent a year.3 The unemployment rate remained 
high in all the countries, averaging over 11 percent for the group. Youth 
unemployment averaged at least twice that rate. The two bright spots on the 
macroeconomic front were inflation and the external balances. Through the 
use of price controls and subsidies, as well as reasonably stable monetary 
policies, inflation rates in 2010 were kept low. The continuing rise in oil prices 
benefited Algeria and Libya, allowing these two countries to substantially 
build up their international reserves, although Morocco and Tunisia were hit 
with the higher import costs of oil. 
However, this relatively good macroeconomic picture in 2010 actually hid 
many deep structural fault lines in the four economies that were exposed by the 
political upheavals in early 2011. These included, among others, high rates of 
total and youth unemployment; large-scale subsidies that strained the public 
finances; an overall business climate that was generally unfriendly towards 
domestic and foreign investors; inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure; 
and large and growing income and wealth inequalities. 
Political Developments 
In 2010, the political situations in these North African countries were, to a 
large extent, similar. In Tunisia, the hopes raised in 1987 with the peaceful 
overthrow of longstanding President Habib Bourguiba by General Zine 
Abedine Ben Ali and his statements in favor of opening Tunisia to democracy 
had been rapidly reversed. Under the distracted eyes of Western countries, 
what began as a mild authoritarian regime incrementally closed all space for 
political and economic participation and adopted a typical crony capitalist 
system. Large segments of the population were excluded from political as 
well as economic participation, and economic disparities were reinforced by 
development policies that favored the coastal areas to the detriment of the 
interior and southern regions. The dismal economic situation coupled with an 
increasingly brutal police state was among the main causes of the revolts that 
swept the country in December 2010. 
Despite the relatively wider popular consensus enjoyed by their regimes, both 
Algeria and Morocco saw the birth of protest movements that contested the 
most authoritarian aspects of their political systems and the consequences 
of their economic policies. These movements demanded sweeping reforms to 
make the political systems more inclusive and the decision making processes 
more transparent. They also called for economic reforms to provide broad-
based growth and much needed jobs. Both Morocco’s King Mohamed VI and 
Algeria’s President Bouteflika appeared to accept the validity of most of these 
demands and announced far-reaching amendments to the constitutions 
of their respective countries. This reaction dissuaded the protests from 
becoming widespread and violent and bought the regimes time to prepare 
countermeasures to ensure their survival. 
The Libyan revolt that exploded in 2011 was a revolution for dignity and 
a quest for political freedoms that had only a minimal basis in economic 
grievances. In Libya, the isolation in which Muammar Qaddafi kept the country 
until the mid-2000s led to a deeper crisis. The relative opening of political and 
economic spaces in Libya starting in 2004-5 exposed the country to foreign 
influence and the population – including the youth – to different models of 
governance. When the population realized that the regime was not willing 
to further increase its opening and promote more inclusiveness, the revolts 
of 2011 broke out. In fact, the three pillars on which the Qaddafi regime had 
based its power – a strong coercive security apparatus, vast rents from the 
sale of oil, and a traditional divide and rule approach – were all still intact and 
showed no cracks until the uprisings occurred, catching most observers totally 
by surprise. 
Political and Economic Developments up to 2016: 
Political Developments 
While the causes of the uprisings and therefore the immediate challenges 
to be overcome by the new political elites were relatively similar in the four 
countries, their post-revolt political evolutions took different directions.4 
From the beginning, Tunisia embarked on a process of reforming its legal 
and political structures in order to allow for a transition to a more pluralistic 
and inclusive system. An interim constitution was drafted to regulate the 
beginning of the transition, and in 2011, Tunisia’s first free and open elections 
were held to select an interim legislature, the National Constituent Assembly. 
The resulting governing coalition was dominated by the Islamist party 
Ennahda, led by the charismatic Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi. The success of 
the Islamists generated opposition among a large segment of the population 
that was fearful of losing its more secular way of life, which had been acquired 
over the past decades. Tensions emerged between the supporters of an Islamist 
vision and those in favor of a more secular one. To resolve the ensuing crisis 
and avoid a dangerous polarization within society, the Tunisian political elites 
decided to join a national dialogue process that facilitated the completion of a 
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new constitution and the consequent 
appointment of a technocratic 
government in January 2014. This 
agreement defused the tensions and 
allowed for the holding of presidential 
and legislative elections at the end 
of 2014. A government led by Prime 
Minister Habib Essid took charge in 
February 2015. 
This new government faced daunting 
challenges, especially in the realm 
of security and political reforms.5 
A native radicalism caused by 
decades of repressive governance 
in conjunction with the instability 
caused by the chaos in Libya rapidly 
emerged as a major threat to the 
stability of Tunisia. In order to 
face this challenge, the Tunisian 
government needed to reform its 
security forces not only in training 
and organization but also in culture 
and mentality. The transition from a 
security force designed to protect an 
authoritarian regime into one whose 
paramount objective is the security of 
the citizen was crucial. On this front, 
the government was slow, in part due 
to the difficulty of balancing the need 
for stricter security measures with 
that of ensuring citizens’ rights and 
freedoms. Another major challenge 
for the Tunisian leadership was to 
transition the political system from 
a strongly centralized model into 
a decentralized one, where more 
decisions and responsibilities fall to 
local authorities. Other important 
reforms that needed to be addressed 
included the implementation 
of a transitional justice process, 
the appointment of important 
institutions such as the Constitutional 
Court, and the further strengthening 
of parliamentary powers. On all these 
fronts as well, Essid’s government 
was slow in acting. 
In Algeria, the protest movement saw 
a rapid decrease in popularity and 
consistency. The traditional capacity 
of the regime to divide its opposition 
through a mixture of repression and 
buy-out seems to have worked, at least 
until now. The constitutional reforms 
announced in 2011 were only revealed 
in mid-2014 and adopted in late 2016, 
and were not as deep and extensive 
as those originally demanded by the 
protesters.6 Meanwhile, the political 
system continues to be run in the 
same way as always, with opacity and 
exclusivity. 
The appearance of stagnation is 
broken only by events and news 
tied to the intra-elite struggle for 
the succession to ailing President 
Bouteflika. The constitutional reforms 
enacted in Morocco appear to be more 
incisive, especially the ones dealing 
with the political process. A notable 
reform was the decision to appoint the 
Prime Minister – who had previously 
been directly appointed by the king 
at his discretion – based on the leader 
of the winning party in legislative 
elections. Coupled with other minor 
reforms, the trend in Morocco seemed 
to be to limit some of the more 
authoritarian aspects of the regime 
in favor of empowering political 
parties. These reforms allowed the 
confront the militias, Libya’s successive governments opted to pay them a 
salary, hoping to buy their obedience. This proved to be a fatal decision, as 
more often than not, the militias pursued their own particular interests, which 
often conflicted with those of the legitimate institutions. 
Moreover, it became rapidly apparent that the revolution against Qaddafi was 
not the revolt of a whole people against a dictator and a few mercenaries, but 
in reality, a civil war between those who still believed in Qaddafi’s Jamahiriyya 
project and those who were ready to change the system altogether. Rather than 
create a national dialogue forum that could lead to a shared solution to the 
divisiveness and consensually define a national identity and national project, 
the new political leaders decided to move rapidly to national elections.9 The 
elections, held in July 2012, proved to be even more divisive and favored 
the further polarization of political actors and society. In 2014, the rivalry 
between pro- and anti-Islamist factions led to the division of the country into 
two spheres of influence, the former centered the former capital of Tripoli 
and the latter in the eastern city of Tobruk. This rivalry has de facto paralyzed 
all economic activities and allowed for the spread of dangerous criminal 
organizations and the proliferation of terrorist organizations, of whom the 
most dangerous is the Islamic State. 
Economic Developments 
The relatively good macroeconomic picture in 2010 actually hid many deep 
structural fault lines in the four economies that were exposed by the political 
upheavals in early 2011. These included, among others, the following: 
• Very high rates of total and youth unemployment;
• Large-scale subsidies that strained the public finances; 
• An overall business climate that was generally unfriendly towards 
domestic and foreign investors; 
• Lack of diversification of the economy, particularly in the case of Algeria 
and Libya; 
• Inadequate and deteriorating infrastructure; and 
• Large and growing income and wealth inequalities. 
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Islamist opposition party, which 
has been leading the government 
for the past five years, to rise to 
power in the 2011 elections.7 The 
political arrangement between the 
monarchy and the Islamists seems 
to be working by maintaining 
the stability of the system while 
allowing a progressive, albeit slow, 
opening.
The challenges facing Libya were 
even more extensive due to the 
devastating impact of Qaddafi’s 
forty years of dictatorship on the 
population. Qaddafi’s erratic and 
idiosyncratic style of governance 
left the Libyan people with a weak 
national identity, a very low level 
of education, no meaningful state 
institutions, and no alternative 
political class that could run the 
country after the fall of the regime.8 
The post-revolution elites were 
therefore incapable of facing these 
challenges and made one mistake 
after another. The 2011 revolt had 
been conducted by local militias 
carrying out fragmented operations 
against the regime without a 
unified command. At the fall of 
the regime, most of these militias 
kept their weapons and entrenched 
their positions, dominating local 
realities and projecting power on 
a national level. The new political 
elites understood the need to create 
a national army and national police 
force, but could not overcome the 
opposition of the leaders of the 
various militias who refused the 
orders to disband. Rather than 
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playing a role in its increasingly dangerous region. In fact, despite a strong 
rapprochement between the Algerian and Moroccan security establishments, 
the relationship between the two major Maghrebi states remains tense. This is 
hampering both countries from playing a constructive role in supporting their 
immediate neighbors. This ultimately creates more instability in their own 
territories, thus creating a catch-22 situation.12 
The domestic situation in Morocco presents a more positive outlook, despite 
some relevant dark spots. In fact, the strategy of slow but increasing reforms 
and incremental political openings undertaken by the monarchy seems to be 
succeeding.13 The change to the previously discretional process of appointing 
the prime minister has led to a more open political process. The parliament has 
become more effective in debating and contesting government actions. This 
in turn has led to a positive perception of political parties by the population, 
which may increase participation and thus defuse extremist impulses, 
particularly among the youth. A reform of the security apparatus to make it 
more responsive to the citizenry has been undertaken, but with modest results 
so far amid continuing reports of police brutality. More recently, arbitrary 
accusations and detentions of journalists have given a perception of raising 
intolerance on the part of the authorities. While these issues undoubtedly 
raise an alarm, they are not enough to condemn the monarchy’s strategy of 
progressive liberalization.
Libya in 2016 is in many respects a failed state. Eighteen months of UN-
led negotiations aimed at resolving the country’s civil strife have not 
produced the result hoped for by most, namely a clear agreement to form a 
national unity government and reunification of the country under a single 
leadership. The Libyan Political Agreement concluded in the Moroccan city 
of Skhirat in late 2015 has only partially been ratified by the Tobruk-based 
House of Representatives, while the Government of National Accord, which 
was appointed on the basis of the agreement, has yet to be ratified.14 This 
has left the political system of the country in a dangerous limbo. Entrenched 
regional interests predominate and supersede national ones, thus creating 
a state of anarchy and disorder. Criminal gangs and terrorist organizations 
are profiting from this unsettled situation, expanding their grip on power and 
entrenching their illegal trafficking.15 The looming economic crisis adds more 
difficulty, potentially turning a tense political situation into a humanitarian 
tragedy. The failure of the UN-led process may force Libyan elites and the 
international community to rethink a way to maintain a united Libya while 
at the same time returning a modicum of order and security. The failure of 
the UN top-down approach might induce some to try a bottom-up approach, 
which would consist of establishing a national conference or assembly that 
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The first order of business after 
2011 was to achieve and maintain 
macroeconomic stability. A key 
component of the policies towards 
this goal was to reform and reduce 
subsidies and improve the public 
finances. However, confronted with 
widespread political turmoil, the 
countries made political stability 
and political transition their highest 
priority. Economic stability and 
growth were viewed as secondary 
and to be tackled later. Consequently, 
none of the countries came up with 
a program to address the economic 
challenges they faced. 
Political and Economic Outlook: 
Political Outlook
This historic moment is a very critical 
one for Tunisia. The progress made 
in promoting more pluralistic and 
inclusive institutions is threatened 
by a growing insecurity caused by a 
terrorist threat as well as by the dire 
economic circumstances. Recently, 
the political system has shown 
fractures, evidenced by the split in 
the majority party, Nidaa Tounes, 
between a component led by former 
Secretary General Mohsen Marzouk 
and a component loyal to the son 
of the President Beji Caid Essebsi. 
Worrisome in particular is the 
return to the political scene of many 
personalities belonging to the Ben Ali 
regime. Their presence may be the 
cause of the slowing down of political 
and economic reforms, as they are 
undoubtedly more comfortable in 
a crony capitalist system than a 
transparent and democratic one. 
Other actors, such as the Tunisian 
General Labor Union (UGTT) and 
the highly centralized bureaucratic 
institutions, also have interests in 
opposing effective reforms.10 The 
main challenge therefore for the 
new political elites is to overcome 
this resistance and undertake the 
necessary actions to keep Tunisia’s 
democratization on track. It remains 
to be seen whether the new national 
unity government headed by Prime 
Minister Youssef Chahed can tackle 
these issues more effectively than his 
predecessor.11 
Despite news breaking events 
such as the dismissal of the long-
time Algerian head of the military 
intelligence (DRS) Mohammed 
Medienne, who was considered by 
many the real kingmaker in Algeria, 
as well as sweeping reforms in the 
security establishment, politics 
seems to go on as usual in Algeria. 
The traditional opacity of the system 
prevents a full understanding of the 
real behind-the-scenes situation. 
In the face of a looming economic 
crisis due to the fall of oil prices, the 
apparent focus of all political activity 
seems to be centered around the 
succession of President Bouteflika. 
The opposition movement is 
marginalized and incapable of 
pressuring the dominant elites into 
engaging with the political and 
economic reforms that the country 
undoubtedly needs to overcome 
its difficulties. This inward and 
paralyzed elite is preventing Algeria 
from moving more decisively towards 
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Monarchy to weather the protests 
and avoid the collapse of the regime.
The Algerian regime adopted a 
similar strategy and avoided the 
fate of the neighboring regimes of 
Libya and Tunisia. The main reason 
adduced for the success of the 
regime in avoiding a fatal outcome 
was the widespread fear among the 
population that a major political 
and economic upheaval would 
cause the return to the disorder 
and horror of the civil war in the 
nineties. In addition to this fear, the 
government has been able to placate 
the population with subsidies, public 
sector pay increases, government 
jobs, and other programs that are 
also intended to divide the potential 
opposition to the regime. It is true that 
these tactics can produce the desired 
outcome only in the short term and 
thanks to the windfall deriving from 
the sale of oil. However, the current 
collapse in the price of oil and the 
lack of reforms that are needed to 
institute a higher degree of political 
legitimacy will soon undermine this 
strategy. Nevertheless, it is fair to say 
that until now the regime’s strategy 
has worked to ensure stability as well 
as its own survival.
Much more interesting is the analysis 
of the reasons why the revolts in 
Tunisia and Libya led to such different 
outcomes. Tunisia has maintained 
peace and public order while at the 
same time realizing what has been 
described as one of the most modern 
constitutions in the Muslim world. 
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would comprise representatives of tribes, municipalities, militias, as well as 
political parties, to agree on a national charter that would define a national 
identity and a national project and appoint a government of unity that could 
carry out the necessary actions to establish state institutions and restore the 
rule of law. 
Economic Outlook
All four economies have been through very trying times since 2011. While 
there has been some progress, the overall economic picture today is still grim. 
In many respects the economies of all four countries are in no better shape, 
and in some cases much worse shape, than they were in 2010. The main goal 
of job creation and broad-based growth still remains elusive. 
Among the many structural reforms required to transform the economies 
fundamentally, two particular areas stand out: labor market reforms and 
improving the business climate to encourage and promote private sector 
activity. It is widely accepted that ultimately it will have to be the private 
sector that will drive the economy and create jobs, and improving the business 
climate to encourage domestic and foreign investors, is critical for all four 
countries, none of whom rank high on standard international indicators of the 
business climate. 
Generating higher growth and employment and creating a business friendly 
environment for private sector-led development will require a host of 
structural and institutional reforms. So far, all the countries have made limited 
progress in this area, although they have been formulating plans to undertake 
these reforms. 
Conclusion 
There are many ways to explain the different outcomes of the 2011 events 
in the four North African countries of Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia; 
indeed, entire books have been devoted to the subject. For the sake of brevity 
and deriving from the above narration, there are few conclusions to be drawn 
for each country. 
While rulers in Libya and Tunisia were felled by the 2011 protests, King 
Mohammed VI succeeded in stifling a protest movement by devolving some of 
his absolute power, spending heavily on the patronage system, and tightening 
security, while at the same time still holding ultimate authority. Coupled with 
the legitimacy traditionally bestowed to the Monarchy as the descendant of 
the Prophet and herald of the unity of the Nation, these tactics allowed the 
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collapse of oil revenues it has lately undertaken wider and more relevant 
initiatives to re-structure its economy. The lack of transparency and openness 
of the political system is nevertheless exacting a toll on how much longer the 
apparent stability of the country could be maintained.
Morocco moved ahead in its politics of slow enlargement of democratic spaces 
while ensuring the stability of the country. The country enacted economic 
reforms intended to create more space for new actors and more participation 
in economic development.
The main lesson to be drawn from the experiences of the four North African 
countries is therefore that in the search for a new social contract that 
establishes wider consensus-based political legitimacy, elites have to be 
willing to undertake openings and reforms in the political arena and adopt 
far-reaching economic reforms simultaneously. The putting off of economic 
reforms has the ability to undo developments on the political front and 
therefore stall all progress.
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Regular elections have been held, 
the Parliament is regularly meeting 
and relatively functional, and civil 
society is vibrant and present in the 
political debate. In contrast, Libya 
finds itself on the verge of collapse. 
Widespread disorder, lack of services, 
fragmentation of authority, high 
crime rates, and economic paralysis 
define the situation in the country. 
There are many immediate reasons 
for outcome, but the main cause 
lies in the fact that both transitional 
administrations had to govern under 
the shadow of the past. 
Many of the differences in outcomes 
in Libya and Tunisia can be explained 
by the differences between the 
political structures in place before 
the uprisings, and in particular by 
the different characteristics of state-
social relations and state institutions. 
Some important features of pre-2011 
Tunisia politics and society included 
an active political opposition 
and associational life and state 
institutions that were effective in 
their administrative functions and 
capacity as well as in their ability to 
act as a central authority. President 
Bourguiba’s policy of free, relatively 
high-quality universal education 
led to an educated middle class 
and an environment that allowed 
for the emergence of political and 
social activists. In addition, policies 
in both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali 
eras experimented with “openings” 
that, albeit within limits, permitted 
opposition parties to form, opposition 
media outlets to be established, and 
associational life to grow. Neither 
regimes closed the country to exterior 
influences and young Tunisians were 
allowed to go abroad to study and 
work, and many returned to Tunisia 
afterwards. 
Qaddafi’s Libya, by contrast, 
witnessed much more brutal and 
unpredictable efforts to squash 
opposition and civil associations, 
as well as a shrewd and brutal 
policy of divide and rule strategy. 
This produced a more fractured, 
frightened, and largely ignorant 
population and most dissenters 
were forced into exile. In addition, 
Qaddafi de facto closed the country 
to the outside world and exterior 
influences. Those who went abroad to 
study remained abroad. Tourism was 
scarce and no foreign media outlets 
were allowed in the country, which 
consequently remained isolated and 
inward looking. Is there any lesson 
then for contemporary theory on 
transitions to democracy to be drawn 
from the different paths taken by the 
four North African countries under 
consideration?
Tunisia is the country that advanced 
furthermost in building a more open, 
inclusive and pluralistic political 
system but finds itself today in grave 
difficulty because of the lack of 
attention to the economic challenges 
present in its system.
Algeria did not move until very 
recently on the political reform area 
and moved very timidly on economic 
reforms, but given the sudden 
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